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THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE
DIVIDE IN SECURITIES LAW: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORMS
GEORGE S. GEORGIEV*
As a regulatory scheme, U.S. securities law has traditionally been designed
around a set of lines—the “public–private divide”—which separate public
companies, public capital, and public markets, from private companies, private capital, and private markets. Until the early 2000s, the lines were successful in establishing two largely coherent legal realms—a highly regulated
public realm and a lightly regulated private realm. A series of bold and
often-inconsistent reforms between 2002 and 2020, however, have transformed this longstanding regime into a low-friction system wherein public
capital flows to both public and private companies, private capital is ever
more abundant, and firms can effectively eschew public company status,
which is both more costly and much less essential to firm success than ever
before. This Article contends that, taken together, these developments have
led to the breakdown of the public–private divide: in effect, the boundaries
between the regulated and unregulated realms have been removed and the
public–private distinction has lost its descriptive and explanatory power as
an organizing principle of securities law. The Article contributes to the literature by (1) putting forward a novel and comprehensive analytical account
of the breakdown of the public–private divide (up through the completion of
the deregulatory cycle), (2) identifying the consequences of these developments with respect to specific firm constituencies and on a systemic level,
* Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. For helpful
comments and discussions, I thank Steven Bank, Jennifer Fan, Kristin Johnson, Kay Levine, Jonathan Nash, Mariana Pargendler, Joanna Shepherd, Verity Winship, and participants in presentations at Emory University School of
Law and the 2021 National Business Law Scholars Conference. This project
has also benefitted from many conversations over the years with other members of the corporate and securities law academy and the feedback of several
securities lawyers. I am grateful to the N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business team
for superb editorial assistance. I welcome comments and reactions via email
and retain responsibility for any errors or omissions.
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and (3) investigating possible reforms and their expected effectiveness in returning securities law to a state of conceptual coherence. The scale of the
problems suggests that the necessary reforms are likely to be foundational.
Given past experience with hasty and crisis-driven legislation enacted by
Congress, the Article urges the SEC to commence a broad deliberative process
involving multiple stakeholders to rethink the appropriate structure of securities law. The outputs from this process will be particularly valuable whenever the next window of opportunity for change arises.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE ARCHITECTURE, GOALS, AND MEANS OF THE
REGULATORY REGIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Public–Private Divide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Becoming a Public Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Motivations for Going Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Pathways to Going Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Regulatory Means and Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Public Company Regulatory Regime . . . .
2. Investor Protection, Capital Formation, and
Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE ROAD TO THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. SOX as Shock . . . and Scapegoat . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Deregulatory Cascade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Capital Raising in 2021 vs. 2000:
An Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Fungibility of Public and Private Capital . . .
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Elective Regulation, Quasi-Federalization, and
“Issuer Choice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Securities Law’s Diminished Regulatory Capacity .
C. Fragmented Investor Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Increased Vulnerability of Employee-Investors . . . . .
IV. REFORMS: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES AND
ROADBLOCKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Rebuilding the Public–Private Divide . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Regulating the Private Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Expanding the Public Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The “Shareholders of Record” Solution . . . . . .
B. Circumventing the Public–Private Divide . . . . . . .
C. Reform Preconditions and Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

223
235
236
239
240
243
247
248
255
258
258
264
275
277
278
279
283
286
290
292
294
294
295
297
303
307
309

2021]

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE

APPENDIX: SELECTED DATA ON TRENDS IN CAPITAL
MARKETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–1: Number of U.S. Listed IPOs (1995–2021) .
Figure A–2: Number of U.S. Listed and U.S. Private
Equity-Owned Companies (2000–2017) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–3: Assets Under Management for U.S. Buyout
Industry (1990–2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–4: Volume of Capital Raised by U.S.
Companies in Public and Private Markets
(2009–2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–5: Volume of Capital Raised by U.S.
Companies in Exempt and Registered Offerings
(2009–2018) (SEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–6: Growth of Global Private Equity and Public
Equity (%) (2000–2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–7: Time to IPO and Market Capitalization at
IPO: Amazon, Google, Facebook, Uber . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–8: Number of Unicorns and Total Capital
Raised by Unicorns in United States, China, and Rest
of the World (2016–2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure A–9: Quarterly Stock Buybacks by S&P 500
Companies (1998–2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

223

312
312
313
313
314
314
315
315
316
316

INTRODUCTION
The first two decades of the 21st century were a busy and
turbulent time for securities law. The regulatory regime, which
had grown in a slow and adaptive fashion since its inception
during the 1930s, was transformed in fundamental ways by
three landmark bills—the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, the
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, and the 2012 JOBS Act—and a series
of related rulemakings by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).1 Many of these reforms were decidedly pro-regulatory and served to heighten the disclosure and governance
obligations of public companies in the name of “investor protection”—the original mainstay of securities law—alongside
looser, public-regarding goals such as transparency and accountability.2 But just as many of the reforms were deregulatory, seeking to change securities law in order to promote
1. See infra Sections II.A–B.
2. See infra Section I.C.
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“capital formation,” a more recent mainstay.3 Comparing securities law in 2021 to securities law in 2001, prior to the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, one cannot help but observe that there is
a lot more regulation today than there was two decades ago,
but that this regulation covers fewer firms and is easier than
ever to avoid.
As a regulatory scheme, U.S. securities law has traditionally been designed around a set of lines—the “public–private
divide”—which separate public companies, public capital, and
public markets, from private companies, private capital, and
private markets. The divide has always been imperfect and, its
foundational role notwithstanding, somewhat undertheorized.4 Until the early 2000s, however, it was successful in establishing two largely coherent legal realms—a highly regulated public one and a lightly regulated private one.
A wide-lens analysis of the myriad of changes in securities
law over the past two decades reveals that the public–private
divide is no more. Even though the law still distinguishes between public and private companies, capital, and markets, the
two coherent legal realms have been supplanted by a low-friction system in which public capital flows to private companies,
private capital is ever more abundant, and firms can effectively
eschew public company status, which is both more costly and
much less essential to firm success than ever before.
Consider the following regulatory paradox: it is possible
today for two firms that are identical in virtually every respect—
business model, size and scope of operations, enterprise value,
access to capital, number of shareholders, number of employees, and so on—to have widely different regulatory obligations.
The firm that is a public company (Firm A) would need to
provide public disclosure on a regular basis about its results of
operations, financial condition, trends and risks affecting the
business, executive compensation, corporate governance arrangements, and various other topics. It would need to estab3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See infra Section I.A. For the first and now-classic analysis of securities
law reforms with respect to a “public–private divide” and the introduction of
the term to the literature, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337 (2013); see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort,
Redrawing the Public–Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013).
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lish and maintain robust internal controls and procedures
over financial reporting. Its board of directors would need to
have specially designated committees with strict qualification
requirements for those serving on them.5
By contrast, the firm that is a private company (Firm B)
would have to do none of that. It could operate in secrecy,
avoid public scrutiny, and eschew the internal governance
structures required of public companies.6 And while both
firms would be covered by the anti-fraud provisions of SEC
Rule 10b-5, Firm A would still be much more likely to face an
enforcement action.7 There are even spillover effects beyond
securities law.8 The key to understanding the paradox is that
(1) public company regulation generally kicks in only if a firm
elects to finance itself on the public capital markets instead of
the private capital markets, and (2) that private markets are
now just as abundant, which renders public company status virtually irrelevant from an access-to-capital point of view. The
public company regulatory paradox is a direct consequence of
the breakdown of the public–private divide in securities law
described in this Article.
5. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act requires public companies to have an audit
committee and disclose whether the committee has a member who is a financial expert. The Dodd–Frank Act requires public companies to have a
compensation committee comprised of independent directors. The New
York Stock Exchange listing requirements, which are, in effect, mandatory
for public companies, add an overlay by requiring public companies seeking
a listing to have a nominating or corporate governance committee. See infra
Section I.C.1.
6. To be sure, the two firms will be subject to the entity laws of their
respective states of organization. If both are corporations incorporated in
Delaware, for example, they would be subject to the Delaware General Corporation Law. State corporate codes, however, are consciously designed to
be “enabling”; as a result, they generally avoid mandatory rules and instead
rely primarily on default rules and opt-in rules. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1417 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Private Company Fraud, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663, 724–29 (2020) (presenting data on SEC enforcement actions against
private companies, which remain rare).
8. As an “issuer” of securities, Firm A would be subject to all provisions
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), whereas Firm B would be subject to a limited subset and would, again, face less scrutiny and less enforcement. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3,
78m(a) (distinguishing the categories of “domestic concern” and “issuer of
securities”).
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In addition to being illogical, the new regulatory reality is
deeply problematic for the way it thwarts core goals of the
modern administrative state. Congress enacted the original securities laws to protect investors from the types of market
abuses that precipitated the stock market crash of 1929 and
the ten-year Great Depression that followed. Much of the complex and costly infrastructure of securities regulation was built
to protect investors by placing conditions on firms’ access to
capital, as well as restrictions on ordinary investors’ ability to
invest in non-public companies.9 This expansive investor protection framework notwithstanding, another element of the
regulatory paradox is that an investor today can invest with the
same ease in both Firm A and Firm B—benefitting from investor protections in the first case but not in the second. Even
more bizarrely, both firms would likely be contained in the
broadly diversified portfolios that have become a staple of
standard 401(k) retirement plans and other popular investment vehicles. Accordingly, it would be difficult for an investor
to avoid putting money in the unregulated firm (Firm B), even
if this were an express goal based on an informed choice. Today’s investors, in other words, are routinely exposed to both
regulated and unregulated firms, which undermines the logic
of investor protection.10
What this Article calls the public company regulatory paradox
has been a creeping phenomenon taking shape over a number
of years. The idiosyncratic architecture of U.S. corporate law,
with responsibility for regulation effectively shared by the federal government and the states, and with built-in regulatory
competition among the states, has always been predisposed to
some degree of inconsistency.11 However, the present moment
represents an inflection point of singular import, which requires us to recognize the paradox and reckon with it head-on.
There are at least three reasons for this. First, a fuller picture is
starting to emerge of the far-reaching consequences of a deregulatory cycle in the area of capital markets, which began
with the 2012 JOBS Act, continued with the 2015 FAST Act,
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. See infra Section III.C.
11. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
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and was completed in November 2020 during the last days of
the Trump administration.12 Second, there is now a growing
appetite for developing targeted solutions to various problems
in the capital markets; any new reform proposals, however,
should be cognizant of the breakdown of the public–private
divide and the changed metastructure of securities law. Third,
and relatedly, the sheer scale of the trends suggests that the
existing framework needs to be rethought.
Consider, for example, the dramatic rise of “unicorns”—
private firms with an implied market valuation of at least $1
billion; such once-rare firms are among the most prominent
manifestations of the deregulation of capital raising during
the 2010s. Figure 1 presents relevant data.
FIGURE 1: NUMBER AND AGGREGATE VALUATION
UNICORNS (2012–2021)13

OF

U.S.-BASED

Whereas there were approximately 43 unicorn firms in
the United States when the term was coined in 2013, at the
end of December 2020 their number stood at 251. Just eleven
months later, at the start of December 2021, it had nearly
doubled to 473. The aggregate implied valuation of U.S. unicorns now stands at $1.58 trillion, which is an eleven-fold in12. See infra Section II.B. For a summary of the expansive November 2020
reforms, see infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
13. This data has been compiled by the author from the current and
historical editions of the unicorn list maintained by CB Insights. See The
Complete List of Unicorn Companies, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/
research-unicorn-companies. The data for 2021 is as of December 3, 2021.
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crease since 2013, and a nearly three-fold increase in 2021
alone.14
The tectonic shifts in capital markets are by no means limited to the arrival and proliferation of unicorns. The annual
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States
has fluctuated considerably over the past 30 years, from a peak
of over 500 IPOs per year for much the late 1990s, to fewer
than 100 IPOs per year for parts of the 2000s, to over 400 IPOs
in 2020 and over 900 in 2021.15 Whereas the number of U.S.
public companies exceeded the number of U.S. private equityowned companies by a considerable margin in 2000, two decades later these positions have been reversed.16 Assets under
management in the U.S. buyout industry, a key source of private capital, have grown steadily—and more than ten-fold—
between 1990 and 2019.17 While data on capital raising in the
opaque private markets is incomplete, it still shows that during
the 2010s more capital was raised on the private markets than
on the public markets.18 Today’s unicorns rely on the private
markets for the growth-intensive stages of their lifecycle,
whereas older-generation tech companies, such as Amazon,
Google/Alphabet, and Facebook, relied predominantly on the
public markets.19 The typical age of tech firms going public
was 7.8 years between 1980 and 2011; since 2012, the year of
the passage of the JOBS Act, it has increased to 11 years.20
14. In considering this data, it is important to bear in mind that the number of unicorns is a function of both entry and exit. The total number of
unicorns increases each time a private startup reaches a $1 billion valuation,
and it decreases when a startup goes public via an IPO (thereby losing its
unicorn status) or gets acquired by another unicorn or by a public company.
As a result, at any given point in time the total number of unicorns and the
aggregate valuation of all unicorns depend on macroeconomic factors, private capital-raising conditions, the state of the public markets (which provide a reference point for private company valuations), IPO conditions,
M&A activity, and other factors. Because of its symbolic nature, the $1 billion
benchmark has not been adjusted for inflation; the valuation data is
presented in current-year dollars.
15. See infra Appendix, Figure A–1.
16. See infra Appendix, Figure A–2.
17. See infra Appendix, Figure A–3.
18. See infra Appendix, Figure A–4 and Figure A–5. A global comparison
of the growth of public market capitalization and private equity net asset
values over time reveals a similar trend. See infra Appendix, Figure A–6.
19. See infra notes 198–200; see also infra Appendix, Figure A–7.
20. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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The headline story that emerges from these datapoints is
clear: not only have U.S. capital markets been in a state of flux,
but the balance between the public and private sides has shifted
for companies, capital, and markets. As we will see, regulatory
policy (both regulation and deregulation) is an inextricable
part of understanding and explaining this transformation:
many of the trends have been driven, at least to some degree,
by regulatory policy; many of them have served as a justification for significant changes in regulatory policy, and, today,
these trends have implications for regulatory policy.
A seminal article on contemporary securities regulation
written by Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson in 2013
opens by observing that “[s]ecurities regulation is under extraordinary stress today.”21 Langevoort & Thompson’s article
was prescient about many of the effects of the JOBS Act and
spurred an extensive literature; its framing observation is true
today more than ever. Writing in 2017, Elisabeth de Fontenay
highlighted the deregulation of private capital and linked it to
the decline of the public company, ultimately concluding that
the existing legal arrangements likely are not sustainable.22 In
analyzing emerging developments, a number of other scholars
touched on the broader theme of the eroding distinction between the public and private sides of securities regulation, as
did financial and legal commentators.23 All the while, the SEC
continued to shift the foundations of securities law—a process
that concluded only at the start of 2021 with the arrival of a
new administration.
This Article contributes to the literature in three primary
ways. First, it puts forward a novel and comprehensive analytical account of the breakdown of the public–private divide.
This account includes an analysis of the full deregulatory cycle,
including the major changes to the capital raising framework
adopted in late 2020. The account goes further in its assessment of the nature and extent of the changes—the use of
“breakdown” as opposed to merely “erosion” is intentional—
and it identifies the public company regulatory paradox as a
major manifestation of the breakdown. The analytical account
21.
22.
Decline
23.

Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 4, at 337.
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the
of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 447 (2017).
See sources cited in Parts I–IV.
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also weaves in extensive evidence about the history, political
economy, and capital market impact of the regulatory developments. Second, the Article contributes by analyzing the consequences from the breakdown of the public–private divide on
specific firm constituencies (investors and employee-investors)
and on a systemic level; the systemic consequences in particular are surprising but heretofore unexamined. Finally, the Article contributes to the literature by investigating possible reforms, including a proposal likely to show up on the SEC’s regulatory agenda, and by assessing these proposals’ expected
effectiveness in returning securities law to a state of conceptual
coherence. In this regard, the Article intentionally avoids making substantive recommendations and instead proposes a deliberative process whereby the SEC and relevant stakeholders
can arrive at the most appropriate substantive solutions.
The Article proceeds in four main parts, each of which is
previewed below.
Part I begins by describing the classic public–private divide in the securities law. More than anything, the public–private divide is a convenient device for conceptualizing
the structure of securities law. The locus and nature of the
public–private divide has traditionally been a function of the
two regulatory spheres established on either side of it: a heavily regulated “public realm” where public companies raise capital from the investing public on the public markets, and a
lightly regulated (and often unregulated) “private realm”
where private companies raise private capital from special classes of investors on non-public markets. After defining the public–private divide, Part I discusses the various mechanisms for
becoming a public company, the evolving rationales for making this choice, and the ever more complex framework regulating the disclosure and governance obligations of public
companies.
Part II focuses on the road to the breakdown of the public–private divide. The story starts with the 2002
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, adopted in the aftermath of massive accounting fraud at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and elsewhere,
which I argue served as the system shock that set into motion
many of the developments that followed. By imposing new substantive and disclosure mandates on public companies,
Sarbanes–Oxley represented a signal step in the “federalization” of corporate governance, a much-criticized development.
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The 2010 Dodd–Frank Act, adopted in the aftermath of the
financial crisis and massive taxpayer-funded corporate bailouts
of 2008–2009, imposed additional regulation and deepened
the role of the federal government in corporate law. The transformative changes put in place by Sarbanes–Oxley and
Dodd–Frank coincided with a growing sense of alarm over the
apparent decline of U.S. public capital markets at the time, as
evidenced by the declining annual number of IPOs and the
overall number of public companies, which in turn raised concerns about a loss of global competitiveness.24
The two contemporaneous developments were quickly
bundled together to suggest that there was a causal relationship: (over)regulation as the cause of economic trouble. Although subsequent research revealed other, more plausible
explanations for the decline in public capital markets, and although the decline in IPOs proved to be a temporary phenomenon, the overregulation narrative had already taken hold in
the media and among policymakers.25 The result was the JOBS
Act, passed with bipartisan support in 2012, which set off what
this Article calls a deregulatory cascade: a cycle of deregulatory
measures aiming to facilitate firms’ capital raising, which continued through 2020. As we will see, some of these measures
exacerbated the very problems they set out to address, which,
in turn, became the rationale for yet more deregulation.26
Two figures included in this Part provide a simplified visual
representation of the shifting trends in the flows of capital
among public and private firms, and public and private markets since the early 2000s due to the various deregulatory developments. Ultimately, these developments have led to the
breakdown of the foundational public–private divide in securities law and the full realization of the present-day public company regulatory paradox.27

24. See infra Section II.A.
25. See infra Section II.A.
26. See infra Section II.B. The deregulatory cascade entailed the following
six developments, some of which are mutually-overlapping: enabling the rise
of unicorns; emphasizing private markets over public markets; enabling the
dramatic rise of private equity; allowing public capital into private companies; transforming public capital into private capital; and promoting regulation-lite regimes. See infra Section II.B.
27. See infra Section II.C.
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Part III shifts the focus from causes to consequences. It
finds that the consequences of the breakdown of the public–private divide have been profound both on a conceptual
and practical level and that they implicate multiple constituencies within and outside the firm. Four broad themes emerge.
First, the federalization of corporate governance, much criticized in academic and policy circles over the past two decades,
today looks more like quasi-federalization: the regulatory provisions at issue are tied to public capital raising and can now be
easily avoided or circumvented by raising capital on the private
markets instead. This is a backdoor, market-based “issuer
choice” regulatory regime, whose merits remain contested in
the academic literature and have never been seriously considered, much less endorsed, by policymakers.28 Second, and relatedly, the breakdown of the public–private divide has undermined the regulatory capacity of securities law: firms can avoid
important disclosure and governance mandates by delaying or
never going public, by going private, or by selling off “bad”
assets to a private company. Since public company regulation
has come to fulfill important roles in ensuring corporate transparency and accountability—and to the extent this development is a desirable one—the breakdown of the public–private
divide is a problem not just for capital market participants, but
for society as a whole.29
The third and fourth sets of consequences relate to mainstream investors and employee-investors, respectively. As regards mainstream investors, there has been a decoupling of
the exclusive relationship between public companies and
mainstream investors and, consequently, an attenuation of the
logic of investor protection upon which much of securities regulation rests. The investor protection issues concern both efficient pricing, i.e., the most basic term of any securities transaction, and matters such as the difficulties in maximizing riskadjusted returns within an investment portfolio due to information asymmetries, suboptimal corporate governance, and
inadequate access to appropriate investment opportunities.30
In addition, the breakdown of the public–private divide
compounds the problems faced by a special class of inves28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See infra Section III.B.
30. See infra Section III.C.
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tors—employees of startup companies who usually receive a
considerable amount of their total compensation in illiquid
and hard-to-value private company stock and stock options
and who are incapable of mitigating through diversification
the firm-specific risk associated with their investment of both
financial and human capital via the employment relationship.
Unlike in the past, these problems are no longer capped in
size or duration, because startups can now raise unlimited
amounts of private capital (with larger private startups having
more employees and, accordingly, more employee-investors),
and because startups can remain private, and thus untouched
by federal corporate governance regulation, virtually indefinitely.31
Part IV considers possible avenues for reform. One set of
options relates to rebuilding the public–private divide—either by
filling various regulatory gaps in the lightly-regulated private
realm, or by adjusting regulation to expand the size of the
public realm.32 As an example of the latter, SEC Commissioner Allison Herren Lee recently put forward a simple, yet
bold proposal: The SEC should revise the concept of “shareholder of record” used in existing legislation to more accurately capture the true number of beneficial owners—a
change that will automatically push a number of large private
companies into the heavily-regulated public realm. An analysis
of this proposal suggests that it will be an effective tool for rebuilding the original public–private divide—and a blunt one
at that, which, somewhat counterintuitively, puts its feasibility
into question. While Commissioner Lee’s proposal will address
most of the problems stemming from the breakdown of the
public–private divide, it does not solve, and will likely exacerbate, problems related to employee-investors.33
A second set of reform options entails circumventing the
public–private divide rather than rebuilding it. This can be done
by shifting some of the economic regulation that currently operates through securities law to other regulatory domains, in
effect lowering the distinction between public and private
companies.34 These options are not mutually exclusive but
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

Section
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they are likely to be difficult and costly to implement. Given
historical patterns of regulation, as well as the political and logistical roadblocks to reform, the Article posits that securities
law may well need to wait until the next big market crisis—or
its next “critical juncture”—before the public company regulatory paradox can be addressed.35
Despite its unspecified timing and outcome, this conclusion need not be viewed as defeatist. There is much that the
SEC, capital market participants, and other corporate governance stakeholders can do now to ensure that when the opportunity for reform arises, it will be used to optimize the regulatory landscape. The recent history of securities regulation is
replete with examples of hastily implemented reforms that did
not enjoy broad support,36 making careful deliberation all the
more important. The recent breakdown of the public–private
divide around which securities regulation has been organized
since the 1930s puts the field in disarray but it also offers opportunities for blue sky thinking. In order to be able to seize
on these opportunities for innovation, it is crucial to understand exactly where we are today and how we got here—a key
goal of this Article.
Before proceeding with the main exposition, a brief note
about scope, approach, and nomenclature. While the Article
touches on all major trends and regulatory developments in
U.S. capital markets since the early 2000s that are relevant to
the topic, it does not catalog every rule change; indeed, to do
so in this context would be impossible. In addition, while the
Article contains extensive technical detail, it ultimately seeks
to translate and analyze discrete legal developments on a conceptual level—in line with the fact that the public–private divide is a conceptual device for thinking about the regulation
of capital raising and capital markets. This makes it necessary
to balance generality and specificity, with all the attendant
trade-offs. To facilitate the translation process, the Article also
35. See infra Section IV.C.
36. The 2012 JOBS Act is the most prominent recent example. As discussed in Section II.B, the JOBS Act was heavily influenced by industry lobbyists. Even though some of its provisions dealt with highly-technical aspects of
securities law, and even though the SEC (as the competent administrative
agency) expressed skepticism about some of the bill’s provisions, the SEC’s
objections barely registered and failed to prevent passage of the bill. See infra
notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
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purposefully avoids various specialized terms from the securities law rulebook unless their use is required by context,37 and,
where the context permits, it uses other, more general terms,
which have a commonly-understood meaning in the legal and
policy community, but no statutory definition.38 Finally, the
Article identifies various trends with the help of available data,
and analyzes their legal and economic determinants as well as
their policy implications. It is worth keeping in mind, of
course, that in certain circumstances data is limited or imperfect, and that causal inferences are always open to contestation.39
I.
THE ARCHITECTURE, GOALS, AND MEANS OF THE
REGULATORY REGIME
To set the stage for the analytical core of the Article, this
Part provides an overview of the structure and scope of securities law as it pertains to public and private companies, public
and private investor capital, and public and private markets. It
does so by discussing the legal provisions that serve to construct the public–private divide, the reasons for and mechanics
37. This includes using “public company” in lieu of specialized terms
such as “issuer,” “registrant,” and “reporting company,” unless those are required in order to draw a meaningful distinction.
38. These terms include “public capital” (generally, capital raised or
traded on the public capital markets and/or capital raised from or traded by
investors not subject to qualification restrictions), “private capital” (generally, capital raised or traded on private capital markets and/or capital raised
from or traded by qualified investors in line with specific regulatory exemptions), “public investors” (generally, mainstream investors whose access to
investment opportunities is regulated and, traditionally, has been more limited), and “private investors” (investors who qualify for special and less-regulated investment opportunities in addition to the opportunities available to
public investors).
39. The following quote from John Coates applies to many of the matters
discussed in this Article: “[C]orporate governance is not rocket science—in
fact, it is much more complicated than rocket science. . . . [T]here are few
consensus views among researchers about any non-trivial topic . . . and evidence tends to emerge slowly, is rarely uncontested, and is subject to constant (and often dramatic reevaluation).” Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs.,
111th Cong. 45 (July 29, 2009) (statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor,
Harvard Law School).
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of becoming a public company, and the far-reaching regulatory consequences of taking on public company status.
A. The Public–Private Divide
The public–private divide is a useful conceptual device for
making sense of much of the original design of U.S. securities
law.40 Each of the securities law statutes, including the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment
Company Act, covers certain economic actors or economic activities while exempting other economic actors or economic
activities from regulation; in other words, each of the statutes
draws lines. In the aggregate, these lines create two regulatory
spheres: a heavily-regulated “public realm” where public companies raise capital from the investing public on the public
markets, and a lightly-regulated (and often unregulated) “private realm” where private companies raise private capital from
special classes of investors on non-public markets. The public–private divide is what separates the public and private—regulated and unregulated—realms. The “breakdown of the public–private divide,” then, refers to the removal of the boundaries between these two realms and the notion that,
functionally, the public–private distinction has lost both its descriptive and its explanatory power as an organizing principle
of securities law.
The genesis of the public–private distinction is Congress’
observation in 1933 that the Securities Act, the first of the
modern securities laws, should not regulate transactions
“where the public benefits are too remote.”41 The Securities
Act put this principle in practice by distinguishing between
public (or “registered”) offerings, which are subject to extensive disclosure requirements and communication restrictions,42 and “transactions by an issuer not involving any public
40. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 4, at 339 (2013) (conceptualizing the public–private divide and noting that it “has long been an entirely under theorized aspect of securities regulation”).
41. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., House Report on Securities
Act of 1933, H.R. Rep. No. 73–85, at 5 (1933).
42. The disclosure requirements at the offering stage under the Securities Act are a subset of the disclosure requirements described in Section
I.C.1 infra; the publicity restrictions relate to gun-jumping and other communication prohibitions. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, U.S. IPO GUIDE
(2021), https://bit.ly/3rCzt0m.
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offering,” which are exempt from registration.43 Since the
term “public offering” was left undefined in the statute, it fell
to the SEC, with a subsequent assist from the Supreme Court,
to map out the public–private line in the Securities Act.
Early on, the SEC focused on a multi-factor approach that
reflected an expansive understanding of publicness.44 In 1953,
the Supreme Court held that an offering to investors who can
“fend for themselves” was not a public offering.45 In 1982, the
SEC issued Regulation D, which largely codified existing practice and anchored the public–private divide with reference to
factors such as aggregate offering price, number and status of
investors, and publicity.46 Significantly, Regulation D placed
heavy reliance on the category of “accredited investors”—sophisticated investors who can “fend for themselves” and who
are allowed to participate in private offerings because they do
not need the full protections of the Securities Act.47 Institutions fit easily within the logic of this concept. In the case of
individual investors, however, sophistication was much more
difficult to capture and the SEC used high income and high
net worth as proxies.48 Issuers could avoid registration—and
the bulk of securities regulation—as long as they conducted a
43. See Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(a)(2). Even though private offerings fall inside the unregulated private realm, private offerings must still comply with various procedures in
order to attain and retain their “private” status.
44. See Letter of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285, 1935
WL 27,785 (Jan. 24, 1935). The release covered the following considerations
with respect to whether or not an offering constituted a “public offering”:
“(1) [t]he number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to
the issuer[,] . . . (2) [t]he number of units offered[,] . . . (3) [t]he size of the
offering,” and “(4) [t]he manner of offering.” Id.
45. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 120 (1953).
46. See Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Release No. 33–6389 (Mar. 8,
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251.
47. It is a less-known fact that the “accredited investor” concept was created by Congress, not the SEC, pursuant to the Small Business Incentive Act
of 1980. See id., at 11,251–52.
48. Among other criteria, Regulation D defines as accredited investors
individuals with an annual income over $200,000 or net worth of at least $1
million. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5)–(6). Because this definition has never
been updated to account for inflation, these thresholds are much lower in
real terms today than they were in 1982. In other words, it takes significantly
less wealth today than it did in 1982 for an investor to be deemed sophisticated. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. The changes implemented
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small offering, to a limited number of sophisticated investors,
and without engaging in general solicitation and general advertising.49 As we will see in Section II.B, the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s has had a particularly erosive effect on these
categories, which has contributed to the breakdown of the
public–private divide.
The Exchange Act also helps structure the public–private
divide. For one, it defines the content of public company regulation (discussed in Section I.C.1), since it sets out the requirements for “reporting companies”—this is the content of the
regulation in the regulated public realm.50 In addition, the Exchange Act draws the line between public and private companies: As discussed in more detail in Section I.B, public companies are those that have conducted a registered offering of securities, elected to list securities on a national securities
exchange, or fall above certain size thresholds pertaining to
number of investors and value of assets.
The Exchange Act complements the Securities Act, but
also reflects a different and somewhat inconsistent approach:
Whereas the focus of the Securities Act is on investor qualification, as determined by wealth and sophistication, the Exchange
Act generally focuses on the funding choices and size attributes of
the issuer.51 (The JOBS Act introduced further inconsistency
by importing the concept of accredited investor into Section
12(g) of the Exchange Act;52 because Section 12(g) has become largely irrelevant, however, the significance of this
change is more symbolic than practical.)

in November 2020 expanded the definition by adding indicators of financial
literacy as qualifying factors. Id.
49. Regulation D, Rules 504–06, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–06.
50. See infra Section I.C.1.
51. The inconsistency in the public–private lines under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act was first discussed in works by Donald Langevoort &
Robert Thompson, and Adam Pritchard. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra
note 4 (noting a “gross inconsistency in how the two main securities statutes—the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933—
approach [the public–private] divide”); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in
Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public
Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2013) (“Both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act reflect a public–private divide, but they take very different
approaches to drawing that line.”).
52. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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The final building block of the public–private divide relates to the regulation of pools of capital. The basic distinction
here is between registered investment companies, such as mutual funds and money-market funds, which are subject to stringent regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
and private investment companies, including private equity
funds and hedge funds, which are generally exempt from registration.53 As we will see in Section II.B, the deregulation of
this sphere has increased the supply of private capital; this increased supply has been able to satisfy the increased demand
for private capital, which has been driven by the deregulation
of matters governed by the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act.
B. Becoming a Public Company
All mainstream business entities in the United States are
organized under state law. Among those, corporations incorporated in Delaware are the most common type of entity that
chooses to become a public company by following one of the
pathways established by federal securities law.54 An entity that
has not chosen to become a public company is referred to as a
private company. The sections that follow discuss two key background matters: why firms become public companies, and how
they go about doing it. Despite the seeming continuity of U.S.
capital markets, the answers to both questions have evolved in
53. For a comprehensive and original analysis of the public–private divide as it pertains to investment companies, see Cary Martin Shelby, Are
Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69
S.M.U. L. REV. 405 (2016). For an insightful analysis of the historical origins
of the distinctive public–private line in this area, see John D. Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management Regulation, 6 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 341 (2012).
54. Note that while the corporation is the most common type of public
company, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and other entity
types may also opt into the public company category established by federal
law. Foreign business entities, somewhat confusingly referred to as “foreign
private issuers,” may also opt into all or, more commonly, a subset of U.S.
public company regulation. Delaware’s dominance as the preferred jurisdiction of incorporation for public companies is illustrated by the fact that in
2020 nearly 68% of Fortune 500 companies were registered in Delaware and
approximately 93% of new U.S. IPOs were conducted by Delaware-registered
entities. See DEL. DIV. CORPS, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS (2020),
https://bit.ly/317nqNq.
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recent years as a result of market developments and in response to regulation.
1. Motivations for Going Public
On a conceptual level, becoming a public company entails a bargain: a heretofore private company gains access to
large and highly liquid pools of public capital, which enables it
to raise funds quickly, efficiently, and at low cost, but, in return, the company becomes subject to an extensive federal
regulatory regime. The foundational rationale for this regime’s existence is the need to protect the “investing public”—
the investors, i.e., suppliers of capital, who buy and sell securities on the public markets.55
The access-to-capital justification for going public has always had the greatest currency, but it increasingly fails to account for the observed market reality. The expanded supply of
private capital due to the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s
makes access to public capital much less of a growth imperative.56 Tech firms such as Uber, Airbnb, and Dropbox were
able to support their growth with private capital for years
before they chose to go public, in each case reaching a previously-unimaginable scale and attaining the status of “unicorns”
(private valuation of at least $1 billion), and, subsequently,
“decacorns” (private valuation of at least $10 billion).57 With
so much private capital on offer, the process of going public—
and becoming subject to federal corporate governance regulation—can be put off for a long time: the median age of U.S.
55. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection
and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 221–22 (2013); JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19, 50 (1982).
56. See infra Sections II.B–C.
57. See, e.g., George S. Georgiev, Securities Laws are Speed Bumps that Prevent
Uber-Sized Wrecks, HILL (June 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/3D3b5aa [hereinafter
Georgiev, Uber-Sized Wrecks] (discussing the rise of unicorns and associated
regulatory issues). The most recent additions to the unicorn nomenclature
are the terms “hectocorn” and “centicorn,” which refer to a private company
with an implied valuation of over $100 billion. While unicorns are now commonplace, hectocorns or centicorns do remain rare. See Michael Sheetz, Elon
Musk’s SpaceX Hits $100 Billion Valuation After Secondary Share Sale, CNBC
(Oct. 8, 2021), https://cnb.cx/3rhq3XD (noting that SpaceX has become
the first, and so far the only, U.S.-based company to reach an implied private
valuation over $100 billion).
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tech firms going public in 1999 was 4 years, whereas in 2020 it
was 12 years.58 Based on 40 years of data, the pre-JOBS Act
(1980–2011) average median was 7.8 years (notwithstanding
the dot-com bust and the global financial crisis, both of which
delayed many IPOs and skew this number upwards), whereas
the post-JOBS Act (2012–2020) average median had increased
considerably to 11 years.59
Beside public versus private capital, another relevant distinction for explaining the changed market realities relates to
the increased importance of non-financial capital relative to financial capital. Evidence suggests that firms in certain industries have more difficulty attracting human capital than financial capital, and, simultaneously, that human capital has become more important than financial capital to many firms’
success.60 A recent study observed that “[p]ossibly for the first
time in history, we’re talent-constrained instead of [financial]
capital-constrained.”61
The increase in the relative importance of human capital
as a result of changes in the economy has impacted the IPO
calculus: At many firms, the going-public decision, ostensibly
about raising new financial capital, has become subordinate to
concerns about attracting and keeping human capital, i.e., the
skills and knowledge embodied in the firm’s employees. Startups often use their own equity to cover part of the compensa-

58. See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING: UPDATED STATISTICS 12
tbl. 4a (2021), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf
[hereinafter Ritter’s IPO Database].
59. Author’s calculations based on data contained in Ritter’s IPO Database.
A prominent discontinuity in the trend occurred in 2008: In the period
1980–2007, the median IPO age ranged between 4 and 9 years; in the period
2008–2020, it ranged between 9 and 14 years. Id. Ritter’s annual data is reported as a median; my calculations for multiple-year periods take the average of the annual median figures, hence the references to “average median.”
60. See, e.g., Vijay Govindarajan et al., Why We Need to Update Financial Reporting for the Digital Era, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/
3rxRpJn (noting that “[f]inancial capital is assumed to be virtually unlimited, while certain types of human capital are in short supply”).
61. Eric Ries, Foreword to SCOTT KUPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW TO GET IT, at xi (2019). See also George S. Georgiev,
The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 TUL. L.
REV. 639 (2021) [hereinafter Georgiev, Human Capital Management] (discussing firms’ adaptive responses to the increased significance of human capital).
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tion packages for executive and non-executive employees.62
Doing so has considerable advantages: saving on salary expenses, managing liquidity, and aligning performance incentives. However, by the time a firm has a sizeable workforce
and/or has been in existence for some time, there is also a
sizeable (and often vocal) group of stakeholders—the firm’s
employees—who have a vested interest in the firm going public.63 Employees prefer for the stock they receive as part of
their compensation to be publicly traded because public company stock is free of trading restrictions, has greater liquidity,
and may command a premium over otherwise-identical private
company stock.64 The human capital justification for going
public does not apply consistently across the economy; instead,
it is a consideration predominantly at tech firms that have a
substantial need for professionals whose skills are scarce.
To be sure, any IPO decision is unlikely to be driven by a
single factor. Beside human capital, there are a number of
other ancillary considerations and explanations that do not revolve around the need to raise new equity capital.65
62. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155
(2019) (describing the process and associated legal challenges).
63. See, e.g., Erin Griffith, Inside Airbnb, Employees Eager for Big Payouts
Pushed It to Go Public, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://nyti.ms/3HXxdqd
(noting tensions among Airbnb’s 6,000-person workforce due to delays in
the IPO process).
64. For an overview of the relevant considerations, see Eric D.
Schoenborn, Equity Compensation at Private Firms: How to Compete for Executive
Talent, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGT. (Jan. 15, 2009), https://bit.ly/31b9D8s.
65. For example, going public gives firms opportunities to adjust their
capital structure. For one, it enables firms to return equity capital to existing
investors by making it possible to borrow more efficiently on the public debt
markets. Alternatively, it enables them to replace one set of investors (venture
capital and private equity funds) with another set of investors (those investing through the public markets). Separately, firms may pursue an IPO because public companies are widely covered in the financial and general press
and enjoy a significant amount of free publicity relative to private companies; this is of particular value to consumer-facing businesses. Public company stock can also serve as an acquisition currency, meaning that an acquisitive firm would benefit from public company status. Finally, going public
may send a positive signal about a firm’s maturity and the quality of its corporate governance: the decision to go public can function as a bonding
mechanism, which might yield real benefits in terms of the cost of capital.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 437 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) (discussing the benefits of
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2. Pathways to Going Public
Whereas the justifications for taking on public company
status come from the realm of business strategy, the process of
doing so is driven by law. Becoming a public company generally involves a carefully choreographed, multi-stage process
that requires financial advisors (underwriters), legal advisors,
auditors, public relations experts, and others. By far, the most
common and most well-known scenario involves conducting
an IPO under the Securities Act of 1933 by issuing new securities as a means of raising additional equity capital.66 Traditional IPOs involve a great degree of intentionality, planning,
and expense,67 all of which have contributed to recent deviations from the default approach.
Another path to going public involves listing already-existing securities on a national stock exchange; this process triggers public company status through the registration requirements contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.68
While relatively uncommon until recently, this avenue for taking on public company status gained more prominence after
Spotify’s direct listing transaction in 2018 and the New York
Stock Exchange’s subsequent efforts to amend its listing requirements to facilitate such transactions.69 Spotify’s direct listing resulted in a near-instantaneous $30 billion public comU.S.-style public company regulation in terms of access to capital); Amir N.
Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 141 (2003) (discussing the nexus between listing on the regulated
public markets and enhanced access to capital).
66. See Securities Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012) (prohibiting the
sale of any security unless a registration statement is effective); id.
§ 77d(a)(2) (declaring that the prohibition does not apply to “transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering”). The specific prescriptions of
the Securities Act, as well as the liability provisions that apply to issuers, their
directors and officers, and to underwriters have made the traditional IPO
process both structured and standardized.
67. See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, supra note 42 (providing a detailed
guide to the mechanics of the traditional IPO process).
68. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(d) (2011).
69. See Marc D. Jaffe et al., Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a
Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 5, 2018), https://
bit.ly/3FZO8GN (discussing Spotify’s innovative direct listing transaction).
Other companies that have taken advantage of this route include Slack, Palantir, Asana, and Thryv Holdings. See Anna T. Pinedo et al., Primary Direct
Listings: A Hybrid Approach to a Traditional IPO Alternative, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
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pany valuation.70 One considerable advantage to direct listings
is the cost saving. Whereas companies pursuing traditional
IPOs pay as much as 7% of the IPO proceeds in fees to their
underwriters and often deliberately underprice the stock to
ensure an “IPO pop” on the first day of public trading, companies going public through direct listings can avoid these
costs.71 Relatedly, removing underwriters from the process also
removes the risk of misaligned incentives in IPO pricing.72
Mergers, acquisitions, and spin-off transactions are also
used to create public companies, or take on public company
status, without conducting a traditional IPO. SPAC transactions—controversial but booming—involve the public listing
of a shell company (a special-purpose acquisition vehicle),
which uses the IPO proceeds to acquire an existing operating
company; the upshot is that the operating company attains
public company status without going through the disclosure
and due diligence process associated with a traditional IPO.73
As illustrated by Figure A–1 in the Appendix, such transactions
have experienced a dramatic resurgence since 2017, having
previously enjoyed a brief spell of popularity immediately
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 24, 2021), https://bit.ly/3leYdYc (discussing precedent transactions and the SEC’s evolving approach to direct listings).
70. See Katie Roof, Spotify Opens at $165.90, Valuing Company at Almost $30
Billion, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2018), https://tcrn.ch/3rejoh7.
71. See Matt Levine, How to Disrupt the IPO Pop, BLOOMBERG OP. (Oct. 4,
2019), https://bloom.bg/3D1uxE0. Evidence suggests that the average IPO
is underpriced by approximately 20% to ensure that the stock price rises on
the first day of trading, which benefits large institutional investors that received initial allocations. See Ritter’s IPO Database, supra note 58, at 4 (reporting that “money left on the table” for all IPOs conducted between 1980 and
2020 averaged 20.1% of proceeds on a proceeds-weighted basis); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Irrepressible Myth That SEC Overregulation Has Chilled
IPOs, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (May 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/3pbqa4j
(discussing IPO mechanics and associated costs).
72. See, e.g., Patrick M. Corrigan, Footloose with Green Shoes: Can Underwriters Profit from IPO Underpricing?, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 908, 914 (2021) (noting
that “[g]reen shoe options break the incentive alignment of underwriters
and issuers to price IPOs as high as possible, since underwriters maximize
the value of green shoe options by pricing the IPO as low as possible”).
73. See, e.g., John Detrixhe, IPOs Are Popping Like It’s 1999, and Executives
Are Fed Up, YAHOO (Sept. 3, 2020), https://yhoo.it/3E7kYF1. The securities
law liability implications of both SPACs and direct listings are as-yet uncharted territory. See John C. Coates, Statement by Acting Director Coates on
SPACs, IPOs and Liability Risk Under the Securities Laws, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 9, 2021), https://bit.ly/3D30FaD.
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prior to the 2008 financial crisis.74 Using somewhat similar
mechanics, reverse mergers are another non-conventional
(and similarly controversial) way to gain public company status.75 Though largely overlooked in the literature, spin-off
transactions in accordance with SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4
are another means of creating a public company. In a spin-off,
an already-existing public company carves out business assets,
bundles them into a new company, and distributes the shares
of this new company as a tax-free dividend to its existing public
shareholders.76
The final mechanism for going public is very important
for purposes of this Article, but it is largely irrelevant for capital market participants; indeed, it is important here precisely
because it has grown to be irrelevant. Under Section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act, if a private company reaches a certain number of public “shareholders of record” and a certain minimum
asset size (jointly, an imperfect proxy for firm size), the company automatically becomes subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and, thus, a public company. In
effect, a business entity could become a public company without taking any affirmative steps to raise capital or improve secondary market liquidity. Congress initially set the registration
trigger at 500 shareholders of record in 1964. In 2012, it raised
the overall registration trigger to 2000 shareholders of record,
added an additional registration trigger at 500 non-accredited
investors, and expressly excluded employee-investors from the

74. The SPAC trend may be curtailed if litigation filed by law professors
John Morley and Robert Jackson in 2021 is successful. Morley and Jackson
have argued that SPACs should be regulated as investment funds (and not
merely as operating companies), which would result in stricter oversight
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin et
al., A SPAC Counterattack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2021), https://nyti.ms/
3lAv61K.
75. See, e.g., Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1588–98 (discussing the law and economics of reverse mergers). Definitionally, reverse mergers are transactions whereby “a private company directly or indirectly merges
into a shell company that has established itself as a public issuer under the
[Exchange] Act.” Id. at 1589.
76. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4 (CF) (Sept. 16, 1997). On the governance implications of spin-offs, see Young Ran (Christine) Kim &
Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate
Spin-Offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2019).
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count.77 (Arguably, the legislative change was initiated to accommodate Facebook, which, at the time, was on course to
reach the 500-shareholder threshold before it was ready to go
public.78)
The higher threshold for mandatory registration post2012, the exclusion of employee-investors from the count, and
the evolution of technologies that artificially deflate the count,
have rendered this provision essentially meaningless. The original rationale behind it, however, is worth bearing in mind: in
1964, Congress determined that firms of a certain size (and,
implicitly, societal footprint) should be subject to federal regulation irrespective of those firms’ capital raising needs and irrespective of their preferences regarding public company status.
There are certain other categories of companies that can
be described as semi-public: because of various characteristics—most notably small size, infancy, and foreign status—they
are subject to a subset of public company regulations, either
permanently or, as in the case of emerging growth companies,
for up to five years.79 The level of heterogeneity and complex77. Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the JOBS Act,
requires a company to register its securities under the Exchange Act if it has
$10 million or more in total assets and a class of equity securities “held of
record” by 2000 or more persons (or 500 or more persons who are not “accredited investors”). See Exchange Act § 12(g)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(1)(A) (2012). Importantly, both numbers exclude shareholders
who received the securities through an employee compensation plan exempt from registration. Id. § 781(g)(5).
78. See Richard Waters, Effects of the JOBS Act Are Hard to Predict, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2012), https://on.ft.com/3E2gsaZ. See also Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 4, at 355–59 (discussing the issue of Facebook’s pre-IPO capital raising in the context of the Exchange Act).
79. For example, “smaller reporting companies,” which generally have a
public float of less than $250 million, are required to disclose less historical
financial information. They also receive exemptions from certain provisions
of the Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Acts, and have more time to file
their reports. Additionally, the JOBS Act created the category of “emerging
growth company” (EGC) for firms with gross annual revenue of less than $1
billion (indexed to inflation and subject to periodic update). EGCs enjoy
substantially reduced disclosure requirements, both under the Securities Act
as part of the IPO process, and under the Exchange Act for purposes of their
ongoing reporting obligations (for up to five years). Regulation A and Regulation CF (Crowdfunding) enable firms to raise small amounts of capital
without complying with the full disclosure regime. Foreign companies issuing securities in the United States also benefit from certain exemptions. See
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ity in the securities laws has expanded considerably as a result
of the developments discussed in Section II.B. This Article focuses on the paradigmatic public company, which is subject to
all the public company regulations described in Section I.C.
C. Regulatory Means and Ends
Public company regulation—the public realm of securities law—comprises a set of interwoven SEC rules and regulations,80 various liability provisions,81 stock exchange listing
rules,82 and public company accounting standards.83 Taken together, these are most accurately described as a loosely-coordinated system of federal corporate governance, which sits atop
the corporate governance provisions contained in applicable
state law statutes.84 Because of its accretive nature and the absence of a single legislative or administrative instrument containing all relevant provisions, public company regulation is
sometimes dismissed as merely a system of investor-oriented
disclosure rules and procedural shareholder voting rules that
are flawed or, at best, ineffectual. Such descriptions, however,
are both reductive and incomplete: certain provisions framed
as disclosure rules extend beyond the dissemination of information and shape internal governance arrangements or corporate behavior; other provisions directly impose substantive
mandates.
George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in
Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 614–16 (2017) [hereinafter Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose].
80. This includes rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to specific mandates in federal legislation, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley
and Dodd–Frank Acts, as well as the SEC’s broad authority over disclosure.
81. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION §§ 7.0–7.17, 12.1–13.2, Westlaw (database updated 2021).
82. Stock exchange listing rules are commonly viewed as an integral part
of public company regulation. Some of these rules stem from the
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Acts, whereas others do not but have the
same effect in practice. See generally Geeyoung Min & Kwon-Yong Jin, Relational Enforcement of Stock Exchange Rules, 47 BYU L. REV. (2021).
83. See, e.g., Corporate Accounting Practices: Is There a Credibility
GAAP?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t
Sponsored Enters., Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 152–64 (2002) (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
84. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19–20 (2018).
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The overview that follows pays special attention to these
points because they are vital to appreciating the full range and
depth of the regulatory regime. It is also worth emphasizing
that this regime represents a significant difference between
private companies, which are subject only to state law rules,
and public companies, which are subject to the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme described here in addition to state law
rules. The overview highlights the deeply problematic nature of
firms’ ability to treat this regime as elective and the resulting
public company regulatory paradox described in the Introduction. The question about the goals of the regulatory regime is
discussed at the end of this section.
1. The Public Company Regulatory Regime
The majority of public companies, as well as the paradigmatic public company, are subject to the full range of public
company regulation.85 The requisite information, including,
in the case of substantive requirements, confirmations of compliance, is disclosed publicly according to timelines devised by
the SEC.86 The regulatory requirements are backed up by an
elaborate liability and enforcement regime, which includes
private enforcement by shareholders (and, in certain cases,
bondholders), public enforcement by the SEC (and, in certain
cases, the DOJ), and a regime of sanctions maintained by the
stock exchanges.87 Enforcement of state law claims often bene85. Recall, however, that firms that fall in certain categories are exempt
from some of the rules, either generally or for a limited time. See Georgiev,
Too Big to Disclose, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86. Depending on the rule in question, disclosure may be called for periodically (yearly or quarterly), on a current basis (promptly upon the occurrence of significant corporate events), or episodically, in connection with
certain major transactions. See DIV. CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL 19, 36 (2008). For example, the SEC’s Form
10-K sets out information to be disclosed on an annual basis, Schedule 14A
sets out information required to be filed in connection with matters subject
to a shareholder vote (usually at the annual general meeting), and Form 10Q sets out information to be disclosed on a quarterly basis. Id. The current
reporting requirements are set out in Form 8-K, which must be filed within
four business days of the occurrence of the relevant event. Id. at 38. As an
example of episodic disclosure, a tender offer would necessitate the filing of
information required under Schedule TO. Id. at 349–50.
87. As part of enforcement proceedings, the SEC routinely enters into
one-off settlement agreements with public companies whereby the companies voluntarily undertake to make substantial changes to their governance
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fits substantially from information disclosed as a result of regulatory requirements under federal law.88 The public nature of
disclosure also guarantees that firms will be subject to public
scrutiny from the media, academics, public interest organizations, politicians, and others.
The most familiar elements of public company regulation
require the reporting of historical information about a firm’s
business activities, financial condition, and results of operations, as well as more forward-looking information about material trends and uncertainties, risks facing the business, and exposure to legal proceedings, among other business and operational issues.89 The shareholder meeting process is also
regulated through a set of requirements that put in place procedural safeguards and mandate disclosure of additional information in connection with matters subject to a shareholder
vote. Such matters include the election of board members,
amendments to the firm’s organizational documents, approval
of certain types of transactions, non-binding resolutions contained in shareholder proposals, and non-binding approval of
executive compensation arrangements.90
Financial reporting is another heavily regulated area. The
relevant rules implicate both the nature and format of information required to be disclosed and, importantly, the internal
procedures and oversight mechanisms within public companies. As a basic matter, public companies are required to file
audited financial statements with the SEC.91 These statements,
which often include lengthy expositions in the form of
“notes,” provide a wealth of information in a standardized forpractices that go beyond what the law requires. See STEINBERG, supra note 84,
at 142–45.
88. See, e.g., In re Clovis Oncology Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS,
2019 WL 4850188 at *5, *7, *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (relying on required
periodic disclosure filings to support review of duty of oversight claim under
Delaware law).
89. These requirements are contained, respectively, in the following provisions of SEC Regulation S-K: Item 101, Item 303, Item 503(c), Item 305,
and Item 103. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 et seq.
90. See Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2020). The votes on shareholder proposals and executive compensation arrangements are advisory to
the board. See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); Regulation S-K Item
402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2020).
91. See Regulation S-K Item 302, 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 (2020); Regulation
S-X Rule 10-01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.10-01 (2020).
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mat.92 The process for promulgating accounting standards, administered by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and overseen by the SEC, also amounts to a form of
public company regulation.93 A separate regulatory body, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), sets
and oversees standards for preparing audit reports.94
The regulation of public company financial reporting covers not just the outputs but also the process. The CEO and
CFOs of public companies are required to certify in periodic
reports filed with the SEC that the financial statements and
other disclosures contained in such reports are accurate, and
fairly and accurately present the company’s operations and financial condition.95 In connection with making this certification, the officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining “disclosure controls and procedures”96 and “internal control over financial reporting.”97 Guidance on how to meet
these mandates is extensive and fairly prescriptive.98 Relatedly,
companies are required to assess and report on the effectiveness of their internal control structure and, if material weaknesses are identified, disclose those to shareholders.99 The internal controls must also be inspected and reported on by an
92. See Regulation S-X Rule 10-01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.10-01.
93. See Standard-Setting Process, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://bit.ly/
2ZAfqny.
94. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012); Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), INVESTOR.GOV, https://bit.ly/
3xzMxVe. While the PCAOB is independent, its members are appointed by
the SEC. Id.
95. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
96. Exchange Act Rule 13a–15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2020).
97. Exchange Act Rule 15d–15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15 (2020). The CEO
and CFO certification requirements in respect of these matters are contained in Regulation S-K Items 307 & 308, 17 C.F.R. § 229.307–308 (2020).
98. See, e.g., PROTIVITI, GUIDE TO THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT: INTERNAL
CONTROL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (4th ed. 2007), https://bit.ly/3o0hnTC.
On the difference between SOX sections 302 and 404, see Shanna Nasiri,
The Differences Between SOX 302 and 404 Requirements, RECIPROCITY (Dec. 5,
2019), https://bit.ly/3pazMwd.
99. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a). The results of the testing must
be reviewed by management, and all control testing failures identified must
be categorized as a deficiency, significant deficiency, or material weakness.
The company is required to report on deficiencies to the Audit Committee
and the Board of Directors, and material weaknesses must be disclosed in
the company’s annual 10-K filing with the SEC. See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, AUDITING STANDARDS (AU) Section 325: COM-
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external auditor.100 In short, the provisions related to financial
reports and the financial reporting process are complex and
extensive.
Certain SEC rules and practices have the effect of imposing higher standards of conduct upon public companies than
what is required under state law. For example, an SEC rule
requires disclosure of any transactions amounting to more
than $120,000 between a public company and any of its executive officers or directors (and their affiliates),101 which serves
to discourage self-dealing and the suboptimal use of corporate
resources. Another SEC rule requires a public company that is
undertaking a transaction whereby existing public shareholders are cashed-out to disclose whether it “reasonably believes
that the [relevant] transaction is fair or unfair” to such shareholders, and the “material factors” upon which this belief is
based.102 Because disclosing that the transaction is “unfair” (or
disclosing fairness without an adequate basis) would subject
the company to litigation, this rule in effect requires public
companies to ensure the fairness of such transactions. To safeguard the economic rights of the shareholders of the acquisition target, the SEC has also engaged in extensive rulemaking
in the context of acquisitions via a tender offer.103
Public company regulation is particularly expansive in the
areas of board structure and composition as well as executive
ABOUT CONTROL DEFICIENCIES IN AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEhttps://bit.ly/3d43lKd.
100. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(b).
101. Regulation S-K Item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2020). The extension
of this rule to affiliates substantially expands its scope due to the broad definition of affiliate under federal law. See Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black &
Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2011); see also
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 57: Related Party Disclosures, FIN.
ACCT. STANDARDS BD. 10 (1982), https://bit.ly/3E2vygH (defining “affiliate”). On the interaction between state and federal law, see Geeyoung Min,
The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party Transactions, 2014
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 663 (2014).
102. Regulation M-A Item 1014, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (2020); see Rule 13e3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2020); Schedule 13E-3 Item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e100 (2020).
103. See Information for Certain Types of Transactions and Filers, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/omalinks (last visited Oct. 30,
2021); STEINBERG, supra note 84, at 140–42. In so doing, the SEC has gone
beyond what is strictly required by the relevant federal statute (the Williams
Act of 1968). Id. at 141 n.150.
MUNICATIONS
MENTS,
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compensation. The relevant provisions are of fairly recent vintage: virtually all stem from Sarbanes–Oxley, Dodd–Frank,
stock exchange listing requirements adopted in the early
2000s, and independent (i.e., not congressionally-mandated)
SEC rulemaking from the 1990s and 2000s. These provisions
have also been subject to the most criticism because they lock
in place arrangements in areas that had theretofore been subject to private ordering due to the lack of state law requirements.104 The net result of the various federal regulatory provisions is a fairly standardized public company governance
model, which is described in a stylized fashion below. By contrast, there is no standardized governance model for private
companies.105
Some of the defining features of the public company governance model pertain to board structure and composition.
Public company boards are comprised of a majority of independent directors and usually have three major committees in
common: an audit committee (with at least one person who
qualifies as a “financial expert”), a compensation committee,
and a nominating committee.106 Each of these committees has
specified responsibilities.107 Public companies are required to
provide detailed information about the skills and qualification

104. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out
of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013). See also sources cited
in Section II.A infra.
105. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 165 (2017). Private companies that are seeking to go public,
however, would eventually conform to the public company model. Id. at 167,
170–71. Some private companies have also adopted elements from the public company governance model in the wake of scandals. See Georgiev, UberSized Wrecks, supra note 57 (highlighting Uber’s voluntary adoption of governance structures that mirror the SEC’s corporate governance requirements).
106. See Martin Edwards, Expert Directors, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051, 1052,
1060–61 (2019); see also STEVEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 160–61, 165–66 (2018).
107. The audit committee oversees internal and external financial reporting; the compensation committee determines executive compensation and
prepares a compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) report for inclusion in the company’s proxy statement; the nominating committee is tasked
with selecting new board members. See NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL,
§§ 3.03A.07, 303A.05 & 3.03A.04, https://bit.ly/3xWySre.
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of directors,108 as well as information about individual board
members’ meeting attendance records.109 The relevant rules
also require information about the board’s leadership structure, and, in particular, whether the CEO also serves as the
chair of the board.110 There is also a requirement to disclose
whether or not the company has adopted a code of ethics.111
Again, disclosure is a significant—but by far not the only—way
to effectuate public company regulation. In the area of executive compensation, for example, both Sarbanes–Oxley and
Dodd–Frank mandated so-called “clawback” provisions in respect of erroneously-awarded incentive-based compensation.112
Controversially, the public company regulatory regime
also contains disclosure requirements pertaining to various
miscellaneous matters. Mainly stemming from the
Dodd–Frank Act, these specialized rules require public companies to disclose information about the pay received by their
median worker and the ratio between median worker pay and
CEO pay;113 information on the use within their supply chains
of “conflict minerals” originating in the Congo and adjoining
countries;114 information about payments made to a foreign
government or the U.S. federal government for the purpose of
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals

108. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343
(Dec. 23, 2009); Regulation S-K Item 401(e), 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (2020).
109. Regulation S-K Item 407(b), 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2020).
110. See Dodd–Frank Act § 972, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2010). In the case of
CEO/Board Chair duality, the stock exchange rules require the appointment of an executive director and the holding of executive board sessions
(without the CEO present). See NYSE LISTED CO. MANUAL, § 303A.03 & Commentary, https://bit.ly/31wyggj; see also NASDAQ REG., 5605(b)(2), https://
bit.ly/3DpL8Sf.
111. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 406. The stock exchange listing rules
elevated this provision from a disclosure to a substantive mandate by requiring that listed public companies adopt a code of ethics meeting certain standards.
112. See Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 14, 23-27 (2016). The Sarbanes–Oxley
clawback rule is in effect but can be enforced only by the SEC; the
Dodd–Frank clawback rule has not been finalized as of this writing.
113. Dodd–Frank Act § 953(b).
114. Id. § 1502.
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(known as “resource extraction payments”);115 information
about mine health and safety (if applicable);116 and information on whether they have engaged in activities covered by the
Iran Sanctions Act.117 These specialized disclosure rules have
been subject to criticism among academic commentators and
even by individual members of the SEC.118 Many were targeted
for legislative repeal119 and two were challenged in court,120
but, with very limited exception, the rules survived and are in
force today.121
The expansive regulatory framework discussed here has
often been described critically as the “federalization of corpo115. Section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Act added Section 13(q) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The original rule promulgated by the SEC
was invalidated by Congress in 2017 pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act. The SEC adopted a revised version of the rule in December 2020. See
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34–90,679, Dec. 16, 2020, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/
34-90679.pdf.
116. Dodd–Frank Act § 1503.
117. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(ITRA), Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214. Section 219 of the ITRA added
a new Section13(r) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
118. See, e.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks at the 34th Annual Current Financial Reporting Issues Conference
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/piwowar-current-financial-reporting-issues-conference.html (criticizing the SEC’s adoption of congressionally-mandated pay ratio and conflict minerals disclosure rules and
arguing that “[t]he focus on non-material, special interest disclosure provisions is a deplorable corruption of our mission to protect investors, to ensure fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate capital formation”).
119. Between 2011 and 2017, at least five distinct House bills targeted various Dodd–Frank provisions; none of these bills became law. See H.R. 10,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 414, 114th Cong.
(2015); H.R. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1062, 112th Cong. (2011).
120. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2013)
(ruling on a challenge to the conflict minerals rule on First Amendment and
APA grounds by the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the Business Roundtable); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953
F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling on a challenge to the resource extraction payments rule).
121. The D.C. Circuit struck down part of the conflict minerals rule but
upheld most of it. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 170 (D.C. Cir.
2015). For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that even though
the Dodd–Frank disclosure mandates discussed here ultimately survived, the
SEC did suffer a significant loss at the D.C. Circuit in connection with a
different Dodd–Frank rule. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down the SEC’s proxy access rule).
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rate governance.”122 This is true, but only up to a point. Because “public company” has become a truly elective category, a
more apt characterization would be “quasi-federalization”:
there is indeed a federal regulatory regime, but firms now
have a meaningful choice about whether to opt into federal
regulation, with all the attendant obligations, or whether to
avoid those obligations and remain subject only to state corporate law. This argument is explored in more detail in Section
III.A.
2. Investor Protection, Capital Formation, and Beyond
After describing the means of public company regulation,
it is worth considering its goals. Unfortunately, due to the size
and scope of the regulatory framework, as well as its age and
the haphazard patterns through which it has evolved, there is
no absolute consensus about these goals as a positive matter—
and even less so as a normative matter. The original statutes
and the extensive lore of securities law focus repeatedly on investor protection. The term, however, is left undefined and
open to interpretation.123 The putative objects of protection—
investors—have been growing ever more heterogeneous over
time.124 This suggests that not only do they need different
types of protection but also that their interests may be in direct

122. STEINBERG, supra note 84. See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 21, 27–28 (2012).
123. See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 55, at 210 (outlining four distinct conceptions of “investor protection” consistent with legislative history and regulatory practice: protecting investors from fraud; protecting investors from
informational asymmetries; protecting investors from tunneling of resources; and protecting investors from making irrational or harmful investment decisions). Separately, if investors’ interests are taken to encompass
non-financial goals, alongside traditional financial ones, then the scope of
investor protection expands considerably and approaches total societal welfare. When investors are fully-diversified “universal owners” holding a slice of
the broad economy, they would be rationally interested in maximizing the
aggregate value of that slice rather than the value of any individual firm
within the investment portfolio. For a modern interpretation and a novel
normative framework, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 566/2021), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3782814.
124. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461
(2015) (presenting a typology of heterogeneous investors).
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conflict.125 Even after these matters are settled, there is still the
difficult question about the effectiveness of particular regulatory interventions in achieving the investor protection goal.
Since 1996, the securities law statutes also include a triad
of additional goals: “promot[ing] efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”126 Among these, the SEC, Congress, and
the policy community have focused almost exclusively on capital formation, which is often presented as a foil to investor protection.127 The concept of capital formation, however, is also
undefined; far from having any deep meaning that can guide
policymaking, in securities law the term is usually used simply
as a stand-in for firms’ ability to raise capital.128 For our purposes, we can ponder whether the goal should be capital formation on the public markets or the private markets, and what
is the efficient level of capital formation. From a total welfare
point of view, one goal of economic regulation should be allocative efficiency—allocating resources, in this case capital, to
their most productive use. Unconstrained capital formation
can be in direct conflict with this goal.129
125. See id.; see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (discussing heterogeneity in investor profiles and interests).
126. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012); Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2012). In 1999, the same provision was added to
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and applies to rulemaking thereunder.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-2(c) (2012).
127. For a discussion of the relevance and importance of competition to
the SEC’s mission, see Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose, supra note 79, at 658–62.
128. Curiously, the term “capital formation” was imported into mainstream securities regulation discourse as recently as the 1990s, without any
elaboration. The term was embedded into law by the National Securities
Markets Improvements Act of 1996 via the amendments cited in note 126
supra. In macroeconomics and neoclassical growth theory, the areas of inquiry where the term has been theorized, capital formation refers to longterm investment as a function of intertemporal choices about saving and
consumption. A report to Congress from 1980 that discussed “federal actions
that could promote capital formation” only lists macroeconomic and public
finance policies, such as reducing the size of the federal deficit, changing
various aspects of the tax system, stabilizing the regulatory environment and
inflation, and assessing the availability of federal credit. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PAD-80-24, AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS INFLUENCING CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES v (1980), https://www.gao.gov/assets/pad-80-24.pdf.
129. This point is not merely academic. The rise of private capital has led
to very significant losses at firms such as Theranos and many unicorns do not
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Increasingly, securities law spills over beyond investor protection and capital formation. Some of the specific public
company disclosure rules, particularly rules stemming from
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank, are difficult to square with
traditional notions of investor protection and capital formation, which suggests that Congress may have had in mind
other goals, even if it did not clearly articulate them.130 Writing in 2013, Langevoort & Thompson noted that “the extent
to which—purely as a descriptive matter—securities regulation
is about social, political, and economic interests, in addition to
investor protection and capital formation, has been seriously
underestimated” and characterized securities regulation as “a
joint project of experimentation in investor protection coupled with a public-driven demand for more transparency,
voice, and accountability . . . as to systemically significant business enterprises.”131 Though this trend continues to meet
heavy resistance,132 it is descriptively accurate, and a further
complication to the ambiguities that bedevil both investor protection and capital formation.
Based on the foregoing discussion, one way to summarize
the goals of securities law is by thinking about a regulatory
scheme that enables investors to maximize risk-adjusted returns on invested capital and firms to maximize funding opportunities (including by minimizing the cost of capital). The
question of whether securities law should focus on minimizing
societal externalities remains subject to debate, as do questions about allocative efficiency and the proper balance
among the various goals. As we will see in the following Part,
these definitional and conceptual issues have made it easier to
justify different types of legislation, thereby contributing to the
breakdown of the public–private divide; unless resolved, these
same definitional and conceptual issues are also likely to pre-

turn a profit. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. On the financial
performance of unicorns, see infra notes 225 & 235 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of
Mechanisms for Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 657, 658–61
(2020) (noting a tendency to frame regulatory interventions with reference
to shareholder/investor protection even when the subject matter does not
justify this).
131. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 4, at 372–73.
132. See, e.g., Piwowar, supra note 118.
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sent a challenge to repairing the public–private divide and securities law more generally.
II.
THE ROAD TO THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE
This Part examines the numerous, often confounding regulatory and market developments related to public companies
since the early 2000s. In the aggregate, these developments
have led to the breakdown of the public–private divide. This
was a gradual process, whose roots can be traced back to the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002; it gained traction due to the decline in the number of public companies in the 2000s, and
ultimately culminated with a long series of deregulatory measures between 2012 and 2020. Because those measures have
been self-reinforcing, this Article refers to them as a deregulatory cascade. These developments are described thematically
in Section II.B and illustrated by two figures in Section II.C.
The bottom line is that the capital raising process in 2021
looks nothing like the capital raising process just two decades
prior.133
A. SOX as Shock . . . and Scapegoat
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (known colloquially as
“SOX”) was the most ambitious federal law pertaining to public companies since the 1930s. It resulted from the financial
scandals in the early 2000s that involved accounting fraud at
well-known firms such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossings,
Tyco, Adelphia, and others.134 The scandals resulted in bankruptcies, the loss of approximately $1.5 trillion in market
133. Based on a close reading of the available evidence, this Article makes
the case that the most consequential changes that ultimately transformed
securities regulation can be traced back to the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. To
be sure, even though securities regulation was more stable during the prior
decades, it was certainly not static. There were several developments that
expanded private markets and the availability of exemptions in primary offerings, such as the initial adoption of Regulation D in 1982 and subsequent
amendments. On this and other points, a different telling of the deregulation story that follows is certainly possible.
134. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron,
Sarbanes–Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus
Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 329 (2003).
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value, and hundreds of thousands of jobs.135 It also contributed to a general unease about the state of U.S. capitalism at
the turn of the 21st century. Thus, SOX sought to restore financial disclosure transparency and revitalize investor confidence in the integrity of U.S. financial markets. As described
in Section I.C, for example, SOX requires the CEO and CFO
to certify the company’s financial statements, and to establish
and maintain “disclosure controls and procedures” and “internal control over financial reporting.”136 The Act also focused
on the boards of directors of public companies, putting in
place various provisions related to director independence and
requiring that public companies establish audit committees,
with certain membership requirements.137
In effect, SOX acted as a shock on the regulatory framework and increased the compliance costs of maintaining public company status. There was widespread skepticism about the
Act’s benefits among practitioners and prominent academics,
one of whom notoriously labeled the legislation “quack corporate governance.”138 This epithet stuck and was applied again
when the Dodd–Frank Act came around just eight years
later.139
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act’s provisions were not self-executing but, instead, required implementation through lengthy
SEC rulemaking. During this process, many of them were debated and heavily contested.140 The SEC enjoys broad exemptive authority,141 so it had the power to delay the effectiveness
135. See Catherine Valenti, A Year After Enron, What’s Changed?, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 27, 2002), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86817 (describing the economic toll of Enron’s downfall). For an academic analysis, see
generally William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
136. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
137. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
138. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
139. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1781, 1821 (2011).
140. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of SarbanesOxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1818–19 (2007).
141. In 1996, Congress added Section 36 to the Exchange Act (under
which the relevant rules fall), providing the SEC with sweeping general exemptive authority in respect of the Act’s provisions “to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1).
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of some of the Act’s provisions and to water down others considerably. As part of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process at the SEC, which lasted for more than half a decade, the
Act’s opponents focused repeatedly on the high compliance
costs imposed by the new rules. This period also saw greater
competition from international capital markets; notably,
London gained attention by promoting its light-touch regulation approach.142 Two prominent working groups were
formed to examine the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. The resulting reports highlighted the high compliance
costs associated with Sarbanes–Oxley’s prescriptive mandates,143 particularly as contrasted with the well-branded “principles-based regulation”144 approach in the United Kingdom.145
The narrative about compliance costs was bolstered by an
easily observable and troubling phenomenon: a substantial decline in new IPOs, which was rationally (though still hastily)
142. See, e.g., Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC
Regulation Outside the United States (Mar. 8, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2007/spch030807rcc.htm (criticizing the “light touch” regime
in the United Kingdom).
143. A 2007 McKinsey and New York City Economic Development Corporation report, which came to be known as the Bloomberg–Schumer Report,
considered New York’s and the United States’ role within global financial
markets. One of its headline findings was that “recent legislative and regulatory actions are hurting America’s financial competitiveness.” See MCKINSEY
& CO. & N.Y.C. ECON. DEV. CORP., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP ii, 86–87 (2007), https://
on.nyc.gov/3D6zMSR. A contemporaneous report by the Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation concluded that “[b]y any meaningful measure,
the competitiveness of the U.S. public equity market has deteriorated significantly in recent years.” COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 1 (2007), https://bit.ly/3xEn5Ob.
144. The term “principles-based regulation” in corporate law and financial regulation has long functioned as a means of encouraging deregulation.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of ‘Principles-Based Systems’ in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007).
145. The perception of stagnation in the United States at the time was also
driven in part by the significant openness to experimentation in capital markets in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann &
Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475
(2011) (discussing capital market innovations in the European Union and
Brazil).
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attributed to the increased costs of being a public company.146
Another element of this narrative was the “going dark” phenomenon, where public companies delisted their securities
and thus exited the public company regulatory sphere.147 By
the start of the 2010s, the total number of public companies in
the United States had shrunk by half, from a peak of 8,025 in
1996 down to 4,101 in 2012; the U.S. decline ran counter to
international trends and was taken as evidence of a significant
“listings gap.”148 The scale and persistence of this phenomenon gave further credence to the over-regulation narrative,
which had always appeared intuitive. The business press regularly ran articles about the death or decline of the public com-

146. See, e.g., The Lure of the Private Firm, ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2004),
https://econ.st/3dUF6yy (“The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation . . . has imposed
on public companies much onerous corporate-governance compliance—a
source of constant complaint from bosses in America and beyond.”); Russ
Garland, Fixing Public Markets’ “Systemic Dysfunction,” WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9,
2009), https://on.wsj.com/3I5JUzk (reporting “evidence of a serious and
systemic dysfunction” in public markets and asserting that Sarbanes–Oxley
rules are “the main scapegoat”) (internal quotations omitted); Uncuffing
Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2012), https://econ.st/3xvT439 (noting
that “onerous regulations” such as Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank are to
blame for an “IPO drought”).
147. The “going dark” phenomenon did not occur spontaneously. Regulatory changes from the mid-2000s greatly facilitated the process of delisting,
i.e., the exit of public companies from the regulated public realm. Some of
those changes were overdue and much needed. But they may have been
overbroad in that they created a rush to the exits, which became known as
“going dark.” This decreased the overall size of public markets and may have
resulted in the delisting (and thus, deregulation) of firms that should have
remained public. See Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135,
140–43 (2009) (describing the delisting process); see also Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115,
123 n.33 (2013). This also routinized “going private” transactions, which involve one investor (or a group of investors), such as a private equity fund,
acquiring the publicly held stock of a company, whether through a merger
or tender offer; some firms have used this process—traditionally thought of
as a once-in-lifecycle transaction—with some frequency and in value-destroying ways. See, e.g., David Scigliuzzo et al., How Private Equity Works, and Took
Over Everything, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 3, 2019), https://
bloom.bg/3p5Urlf.
148. See Craig Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 21,181, 2015) (“The number of U.S. listings fell
from 8,025 in 1996 to 4,101 in 2012, whereas non-U.S. listings increased
from 30,734 to 39,427.”).
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pany, public capital markets, and IPOs.149 Commentators and
policymakers began to consider measures to reverse these phenomena by decreasing the subset of companies to which
Sarbanes–Oxley, and the rest of public company regulation,
applies.150 In short, Sarbanes–Oxley catalyzed the erosion of
the public company regulatory sphere and, for a long time,
market data provided the oxygen to keep this process going.
Well over a decade after Sarbanes–Oxley’s adoption, it
turned out that the over-regulation narrative was not just oversimplified but also wrong. High-quality empirical studies
found that other factors caused the decline in IPO activity and
the number of public companies. One study showed that the
decline in small-firm IPOs started in 1998, well before the
adoption of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank, and is attributable to a decrease in demand by institutional investors rather
than to supply-side factors such as the cost of being a public
company.151 Another study noted that “market forces independent of regulation” (including increased M&A activity, greater
availability of private capital, and changes in investment patterns) explained the decline in IPOs.152 The study also highlighted the fact that the decline in IPOs was primarily a de149. See, e.g., Jason Zweig, The Demise of the IPO—and Ideas on How to Revive
It, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2010), https://on.wsj.com/3D39mlc (analyzing various challenges to IPO activity and stating that the IPO market is in “suspended animation”); Alix Stuart, Missing: Public Companies – Why is the Number of Publicly Traded Companies in the U.S. Declining?, CFO MAG. (Mar. 22,
2011), https://bit.ly/3xEnCj9 (discussing data on the decrease in the number of public companies and new IPOs and advocating for “a completely
different market model” (quoting Edward Kim, capital markets senior advisor at Grant Thornton)); Brad Stone, Silicon Valley Cashes Out Selling Private
Shares, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 21, 2011), https://bloom.bg/
3E7ep5m (noting that “[o]wing to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other regulatory changes to capital markets over the past decade, the IPO is no longer an
attractive goal for many companies”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, C.E.O.s Meet in
Secret over the Sorry State of Public Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), https:/
/nyti.ms/3xFzf9G (asserting that “[p]ublicly listed companies in the United
States have become something of a dying breed”).
150. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
151. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The
Small IPO and the Investing Preferences of Mutual Funds, 47 J. CORP. FIN. 151,
163, 165 (2017).
152. See Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs
Gone: The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 87 (2016) (emphasis added).
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cline in small-firm IPOs, not IPOs across the board.153 A third
empirical study similarly rejected the “regulatory overreach”
hypothesis.154 Neither the findings of these studies, which
never truly penetrated the policymaking community,155 nor
the recovery in the annual number of IPOs during much of
the 2010s,156 were successful in stopping the deregulatory cascade, which at that point was well underway. As we will see, the
2012 JOBS Act and the SEC’s concerted push to deregulate
capital raising during the tenure of Chairman Jay Clayton
scrambled the internal logic of securities regulation and set off
a process of regulatory line-drawing, re-drawing, and, ultimately, erasure.
Another point, discussed in more detail in Section III.B,
deserves mention here. The high compliance costs of
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank were blamed for causing the
demise of the “public company” as a type of business entity.
Yet, “public company” is merely a regulatory category that captures certain entities if they meet a set of pre-defined characteristics.157 As we will see, Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank
may have caused the near-demise of “public company” as a
regulatory category by feeding into the over-regulation narrative and instigating the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s.

153. Id. at 87, 120.
154. See Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the
IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1663, 1669–71 (2013) (rejecting a
“regulatory overreach” hypothesis for the decline in the number of smallfirm IPOs in favor of an “economies of scope” hypothesis that focuses on the
advantages enjoyed by large firms). As I have discussed in prior work, these
large-firm advantages also stem from the application of a key tool of securities regulation—the TSC Industries materiality standard embedded in a number of disclosure rules, which does not take into account firm size. See Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose, supra note 79, at 652–62 (suggesting that materiality functions as a “regulatory subsidy for bigness” since it often enables large
firms to disclose less information than small firms).
155. Congress continued to hold hearings themed around solving the purported problem of regulatory overreach. See, e.g., The Cost of Being a Public
Company in Light of Sarbanes Oxley and the Federalization of Corporate Governance:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts, Sec., & Inv. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 115th Cong. (July 18, 2017).
156. See infra Appendix, Figure A–1.
157. See supra Section I.B.1.

264

NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 18:221

B. The Deregulatory Cascade
The public model of financing, whereby a growing company needs to go public in order to access additional capital
and, as part of this process, commits to public company regulation, was the dominant model for much of the 20th century
and at the dawn of the 21st century. Just two decades later, in
2021, this is no longer the case. The transformation of the capital raising ecosystem has been the product of numerous actions taken by Congress and the SEC, mostly during the 2010s,
that have touched and altered virtually every aspect of the regulatory system governing firms’ capital raising activities: the
types of capital, the types of investors, and types of markets
that firms of different kinds can access in exchange for undertaking certain legal obligations.
This section starts by analyzing the political economy of
the deregulatory cascade and then thematically sets out the
many technical deregulatory developments that have occurred, primarily since the passage of the JOBS Act in 2012.
The figures in Section II.C provide a schematic illustration of
these developments. At the outset, I should note that not every
individual development that is part of the deregulatory cascade is problematic as a matter of policy; indeed, some were
well-advised and overdue. But their execution—and the combination of sensible changes and changes hastily put in place
to serve ideological goals—render the deregulatory cascade a
negative development as a whole.
After the Dodd–Frank Act was signed into law in July
2010, many in the media and policy establishment in Washington, D.C. assumed that the mission of preventing a repeat of
the 2008 financial crisis had been accomplished and moved on
to other hot-button issues. Others immediately shifted their attention to the fraught process of agency rulemaking needed to
implement the Act’s provisions.158 But less than two years later
(and working in Dodd–Frank’s shadow), Congress hastily
passed another important piece of financial legislation, which

158. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure As
Soundbite: The Case of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1128–29, 1139
(2019) (discussing the protracted process of implementing the pay ratio disclosure mandate contained in the Dodd–Frank Act).
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received relatively little popular attention: the strategically-titled JOBS Act of 2012.159
The JOBS Act contained a smorgasbord of provisions related to equity crowdfunding, amendments to various securities offering rules, the creation of a new, time-limited regulatory category—the “emerging growth company” (EGC), and a
directive to the SEC to study further changes to the securities
disclosure regime. The only broad themes that can be discerned in the JOBS Act are laissez-faire capital formation and
an attempt to reverse the supposed regulatory overreach of
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank.160 It likely would have been
impossible to sell this grand deregulatory design politically if it
had been clearly reflected in the JOBS Act. Instead, the JOBS
Act proceeded piecemeal through a series of small and easy-tooverlook rule amendments, exemptions, and efforts to “modernize” the regulatory framework.
The political economy of the JOBS Act is worth noting
because it challenges the view of securities regulation as a technocratic enterprise—a special and highly-specialized type of
economic regulation that is relatively free of interest group
lobbying and political influence. The JOBS Act was heavily
supported by tech companies in Silicon Valley during an era of
unbridled tech optimism among policymakers and the media;161 shortly after, Amazon, Facebook, Google/Alphabet,
Microsoft, and Apple joined the ranks of the world’s largest
companies, which they hold to this day. The Obama adminis159. The Act’s awkward full title—the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act—illustrates the linguistic gymnastics its drafters employed to arrive at
the palatable acronym “JOBS.” Though very little, if anything, in the Act was
substantively related to boosting jobs and employment, the JOBS moniker
made it more difficult to oppose the bill during a period of high unemployment and the lagging recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.
160. The SEC’s approach in implementing congressional mandates and
amending its own rules during the 2010s, at least as exemplified by the rhetoric of a number of SEC Commissioners and senior staff, has focused on
capital formation, with more always being better. This basic premise is
flawed when viewed from the point of view of financial economics and management science. To mention just a few possibilities, firms can easily become
overleveraged, capital may be misallocated, and too much capital may lead
to corporate waste and inefficiencies.
161. See James Freeman, Kate Mitchell: How Silicon Valley Won in Washington,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2012), https://on.wsj.com/3lCsQaz (discussing the role
of tech firm lobbying in generating bipartisan political backing for the JOBS
Act).
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tration was firm in its support of the JOBS Act,162 even though
investors, other stakeholders, academics, and the Obama-appointed SEC Chair raised a series of concerns.163 Even the
name of the legislation, meant to evoke job creation, was a
brilliant stroke of Silicon Valley marketing. A link between the
JOBS Act’s provisions and actual jobs was never demonstrated
and has not materialized. In fact, to the extent the JOBS Act
contributed to the rise of the gig economy exemplified by
firms such as Uber and DoorDash where workers are independent contractors instead of employees and do not benefit from
various worker protections, the JOBS Act may have contributed to the destruction of conventional jobs.
By facilitating the raising of capital on the private markets,
certain JOBS Act provisions resulted in decreased public capital
formation. Recall, however, that public capital formation was
the problem, whether real or imagined, that the JOBS Act was
supposed to solve. When the solutions did not come, Congress
doubled down by adding provisions deregulating capital formation (dubbed JOBS Act 2.0) in the infrastructure-focused
FAST Act in 2015.164 The SEC quickly implemented the provisions of the FAST Act, even though the agency still had a back162. The genesis of many of the specific ideas contained in the JOBS Act
can be traced back to a report prepared by the IPO Task Force, an ad hoc
group dominated by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and
the bankers, lawyers and accountants representing them. See IPO TASK
FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND
THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH (2011), https://www.sec.
gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf; see also Freeman, supra note 161 (noting how a Democratic venture capitalist
shepherded the JOBS Act); see also Pritchard, supra note 51, at 1008–09 (noting that President Obama signed the bill into law because he was “anxious to
portray himself as ‘pro-growth’ while facing an economy still plagued by
high levels of unemployment”).
163. See 158 Cong. Rec. 1698–99 (2012) (letter of SEC Chairman Mary L.
Schapiro) (expressing the SEC’s concern with various provisions in the draft
version of the bill, which ultimately became law). Academic commentators
also raised concerns. See John Coates & Robert Pozen, Bill to Help Businesses
Raise Capital Goes Too Far, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012), https://wapo.st/
3FVm6fv; Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Affs., 112th Cong.
13 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University
Law School).
164. See Stacy Kanter, FAST Act: Capital Formation Changes and Reduced Disclosure Burdens, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://bit.ly/3HZ2Yz5. The FAST Act included technical changes, such as
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log of unfinished, congressionally-required rulemakings under
the Dodd–Frank Act from five years prior. Thus, the SEC continued to prioritize the deregulation of the private markets in
the name of public capital formation.
The deregulatory cycle was completed just a day before
the November 2020 presidential election, with the looming
prospect of a new administration, new composition of the
SEC, and a policy reversal. On a split 3–2 vote, the agency
adopted extensive rule amendments ostensibly seeking to
“harmonize and improve” the “patchwork” private offering
framework.165 In reality, however, the SEC retained the “patchwork” and merely increased the size of the constitutive exemption “patches.” Among other matters, the amendments
changed existing limits on the timing and size of private offerings.166 In effect, they permitted larger and more frequent private offerings to be offered more widely to the general public.
Notably, the SEC was also tasked by Congress with taking some
steps that modernized the regulatory framework by updating
rather than eroding it. Updating Form D to make it more informative and updating the wealth thresholds under the definition of “accredited investor” are a case in point.167 The SEC
codifying the informal Section 4(a)(11/2) exemption for private resales and
it also expanded further the accommodations provided to EGCs. Id.
165. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Harmonizes and
Improves “Patchwork” Exempt Offering Framework (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-273 [hereinafter Summary of November 2020 Amendments]; see also Adam Fleisher et al., SEC Harmonizes Regulation and Improves Access to Capital in Private Markets, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3rA1HIZ (describing amendments and noting the 3–2 vote).
166. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Facilitating Capital Formation and
Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets, Final Rule, Rel. No. 33-10,884 (adopted Nov. 2, 2020), 86 Fed.
Reg. 3496 (Mar. 15, 2021) (including amendments to: raise offering limits
for certain exempt offerings; relax investment limitations for certain investors; shorten the integration safe harbor period from six months to 30 days;
expand the use of test-the-waters communications across all exempt offerings and for all types of investors; reduce disclosure requirements under
Regulation D; and permit the creation of a crowdfunding special purpose
vehicle, among other matters).
167. The SEC has failed to finalize its 2013 proposal to amend Form D to
enhance investors’ ability to evaluate offerings under Regulation D. See
Amendments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,222
(proposed July 10, 2013). In addition, it has failed to adjust the accredited
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placed these low on its priority list and, as of this writing, has
not completed the required rulemakings.
The late stages of the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s
were also characterized by a curious shift in rhetoric. Previously, lobbyists had used “capital formation” as the primary justification for deregulation; while poorly defined, the term
“capital formation” is part of the SEC’s mission.168 In light of
the growth of private markets, the rise of unicorns, and the
recovery of the IPO market, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that firms are having a difficult time
raising capital. To account for this, lobbying efforts leading up
to the November 2020 amendments focused on giving retail
investors appropriate investment opportunities, which included giving them access to the unregulated private markets.169 The SEC enthusiastically picked up on the “investor
opportunity” leitmotif in the proposing and adopting releases
pertaining to the November 2020 amendments. This was done
with little regard for the risks inherent in such opportunities
and traditional notions of investor protection.170 Another way
to frame this set of initiatives that similarly conceals their prob-

investor wealth thresholds to account for inflation. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified Nov. 22, 2021) (stating
the SEC’s mission as “protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation”). See also discussion infra
Section I.C.2.
169. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REGUL., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INVESTORS AND RETIREES: PRIVATE EQUITY (2018), https://bit.ly/3y1mK8C
(advocating for a number of deregulatory changes which were subsequently
adopted, with reference to “expanding opportunities”).
170. See, e.g., Press Release, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement on Amendments to the Exempt Offering
Framework (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
lee-harmonization-2020-11-02. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has defined
“investor opportunity” as “the chance for investors to try new products and
services, to include in their portfolios new types of assets, to use the latest
technologies, to get in on the ground floor of new opportunities, to experiment and learn from investment successes and failures.” See Hester M.
Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Meeting of Investor
Advisory Committee (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-iac-090921.
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lematic nature has been as an effort to “democratize” capital
markets.171
Zooming out, the developments that made up the deregulatory cascade were not only highly technical but also piecemeal. The discussion that follows organizes these developments around themes. The thematic approach adopted here
and in the two figures in Section II.C offers a big-picture overview of how the many individual developments from the 2010s
have transformed the legal framework for capital raising. The
deregulatory cascade is defined by decisions from Congress,
the SEC, and, in one instance, the Department of Labor, along
the following six overlapping dimensions: (1) enabling the rise
of unicorns; (2) emphasizing private markets over public markets; (3) enabling the dramatic rise of private equity; (4) allowing public capital into private companies; (5) transforming
public capital into private capital; and (6) promoting regulation-lite regimes.
(1) Enabling the Rise of Unicorns: Perhaps the most visible
development in capital markets during the 2010s has been the
rise of “unicorns”: firms with valuations over $1 billion that
have not (yet) conducted an initial public offering and are not
public companies. Fast-growing firms like SpaceX (private valuation: $100.3 billion), Stripe ($95 billion), Instacart ($39 billion), Juul Labs ($12 billion), Ripple ($10 billion), Reddit
($10 billion), and MasterClass ($2.75 billion) are just some of
the more familiar names that currently fall in this category;
Uber, Lyft, Box, Dropbox, Airbnb, Doordash, Spotify, and
Robinhood, among many others, are ex-unicorns.172 As noted
in the Introduction, the growth in the number and implied
market value of unicorns has been staggering: from 43 unicorns when the term was first coined in 2013 to 473 unicorns
171. See, e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn
Investors, 87 TENN. L. REV. 983, 994–1000 (2020) (discussing “democratization” of private markets). The benign-sounding rhetoric of democratizing
markets echoes the marketing efforts of ill-fated fintech startups, such as
Robinhood. See, e.g., Jared Dillian, Robinhood Is Not About the Democratization of
Markets, BLOOMBERG OP. (Aug. 11, 2021), https://bloom.bg/3q592xB (discussing Robinhood’s marketing rhetoric and noting that “[r]etail trading of
meme stocks is just a massive transfer of wealth from the unsophisticated to
the sophisticated”).
172. See The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.
cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies (last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
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in early December 2021, reaching an aggregate implied valuation of $1.58 trillion, which is an eleven-fold increase since
2013, and a nearly three-fold increase in 2021 alone.173 These
developments are not limited to the United States, as shown by
Figure A–8 in the Appendix, but extend to capital markets in
China and the rest of the world.
Though private, unicorns look and behave like public
companies in terms of market capitalization, number of employees, global reach, and potential for inflicting externalities.
They have been able to raise capital and sustain their growth
without tapping the public markets. The previous generation
of fast-growing tech companies, such as Google, Amazon, and
others, had to conduct an IPO much earlier in their lifecycle
and, correspondingly, achieved the bulk of their present-day
market capitalization in the public markets (as shown by Figure A–7 in the Appendix). Today, unicorn companies are so
ubiquitous in the U.S. economy that the unicorn label seems
like a misnomer.
The rise of unicorns was a regulatory development due to
the much wider availability of “private capital.”174 In addition,
the JOBS Act raised the mandatory registration thresholds
contained in Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, enabling
companies to acquire a much larger investor base before
mandatory registration (and federal corporate governance
regulation) is required.175 As discussed below, the SEC has
also adopted various rules that encourage private placements,
which permit unicorns to raise substantial capital without trading unicorn status (and the associated freedom and secrecy)
for public company status (and the associated regulatory compliance obligations and transparency). The SEC and Congress
failed to anticipate and account for the informational
173. See supra Figure 1 & notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
174. See de Fontenay, supra note 22, at 447.
175. Recall that Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the
JOBS Act, requires a company to register its securities under the Exchange
Act if it has $10 million or more in total assets and a class of equity securities
“held of record” by 2000 or more persons (or 500 or more persons who are
not “accredited investors”). See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The
question about the reach of Section 12(g) is not a simple one. Usha Rodrigues, for example, has argued that the rule was irrelevant even before the
JOBS Act. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section
12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529 (2015).
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problems raised by unicorns, and these problems quickly
morphed into governance problems, as illustrated by the multiple scandals at WeWork, Uber, Theranos, and elsewhere.176
(2) Emphasizing Private Markets Over Public Markets: The expansion of exemptions from public registration, most prominently under Rule 506,177 has made it easier and easier for
firms to attain scale solely based on the investment of accredited investors. Rule 701 has made it easier for private companies to pay employees in stock and stock options; while the
rule has been around since the 1980s, the growth in the number of unicorns and their total employee headcount during
the 2010s, as well as the doubling of relevant offering limits in
2018, has amplified the rule’s significance.178 New, creative
ways of doing the same have been under consideration;179
these would, for instance, allow private platform companies,
like pre-IPO Uber and Airbnb, to pay non-employee drivers
and hosts, respectively, with stock. These private transactions
further undermine the need for public markets, from the per176. See, e.g., Rani Molla & Shirin Ghaffary, The WeWork Mess, Explained,
VOX (Oct. 22, 2019), https://bit.ly/3rf663J (discussing governance
problems at WeWork); Georgiev, Uber-Sized Wrecks, supra note 57 (discussing
Uber); John Carreyrou, SEC Charges Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes With
Fraud, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://on.wsj.com/3lgMYyN (discussing
Theranos).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2021). Though the availability of aggregate data
is limited, the SEC’s Concept Release suggests that most private capital is
raised using the exemptions provided in Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c). See
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities
Offering Exemptions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,460, 30,466 (June 26, 2019).
178. SEC Rule 701, adopted in 1988, allows private companies to offer and
sell securities as part of compensatory arrangements without the need to
register the securities. See Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, Securities Act Release No. 33–6768, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,918–19 (Apr. 20, 1988). While
this provision is not new, its use increased considerably in the post-JOBS Act
capital markets ecosystem. In addition, as directed by the Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, the SEC increased
from $5 million to $10 million the 12-month offering threshold in excess of
which firms are required to deliver additional information to employee-investors. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Press Release, SEC Adopts Final
Rules and Solicits Public Comment on Ways to Modernize Offerings Pursuant to Compensatory Arrangements (July 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ne
ws/press-release/2018-135.
179. See Concept Release on Compensatory Securities Offerings and Sales,
Exchange Act Release No. 33–10,521, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,958–59 (July 24,
2018).
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spective of both firms and investors. The so-called Regulation
A+ enables firms to raise certain amounts of capital from public investors without becoming subject to public company regulation.180
The November 2020 amendments to the securities laws
changed existing limits on the timing and size of private offerings. For example, the SEC raised the offering limit in Regulation Crowdfunding from $1.07 million to $5 million, while at
the same time removing the cap on the amounts accredited
investors can invest in each offering.181 This affected both the
supply and demand sides of these transactions. Similarly, the
SEC doubled the limit for offerings under Rule 504 of Regulation D, from $5 million to $10 million.182
One notable feature of the November 2010 amendments
is that even though the SEC raised the offering limits, presumably, at least in part, to account for inflation, it did not raise
the thresholds under the definition of “accredited investor.”
Recall from Part I that this category seeks to capture certain
wealthy investors, who are presumed to be less sensitive to financial losses, and/or more financially-sophisticated investors.
Failing to update qualification requirements for inflation has
led to a 550% increase in the percentage of households qualifying as accredited investors since 1983 (from 2% of all U.S.
households to 13% of all U.S. households).183 In practice, this
means that there has been a 550% increase in the share of
households that can be exposed to unregulated (and often
risky) financial instruments.
(3) Enabling the Dramatic Rise of Private Equity: Private assets
under management have grown more than five-fold since
180. Adopted in April 2015, the rules referred to as Regulation A+ revise
Regulation A to create two separate tiers of exempt securities offerings not
exceeding $20 million and $50 million, respectively, in any 12-month period.
See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act
Release No. 74,578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2501, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015). These limits were raised through the November 2020
amendments discussed below. The market performance of firms taking advantage of these provisions has been dismal. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
181. See Summary of November 2020 Amendments, supra note 165.
182. Id.
183. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Securities Act Release No. 10,824, Exchange Act Release No. 89,669 (Aug. 26, 2020).
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2000: from less than $1 trillion in 2000 to more than $5 trillion
in 2017.184 The existence of this sizeable pool of private capital
has gradually undermined the essential nature of public markets to capital raising.185 The rise of private equity has resulted
from a combination of active deregulation and abstention
from regulating new types of transactions that are functionally
equivalent to transactions that had been regulated in the past.
(4) Allowing Public Capital into Private Companies: The SEC
permits mutual funds to invest up to 15% of their assets in the
stock of private companies.186 Mutual funds represent trillions
in capital that originates from prototypical “public” investors,
i.e., unsophisticated investors who should get protection from
the securities laws. For example, in 2018, the 12th-largest investment in Fidelity’s $25 billion Blue Chip Growth Fund was a
$438 million stake in Juul (a private company that does not
seem to fit the “blue chip” label in the fund’s name); the
fund’s investment in unicorn Juul was greater than its investment in true “blue chip” firms like MasterCard and Netflix.187
The investor protection concerns associated with this development are many and varied.188 The expansion of the offering
exemptions discussed under item (2) above represents another mechanism through which more and more public capital can flow into private companies.
(5) Transforming Public Capital into Private Capital: In addition to allowing public capital into private companies directly,
there are now multiple other, indirect ways for public capital
to end up in private companies. A 2020 rule change from the
Department of Labor allowed defined contribution plans to
184. Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://
bit.ly/3rf677N.
185. See id.; see also infra Appendix, Figure A–3 (showing growth in assets
under management for the U.S. buyout industry) & Figure A–6 (showing
global growth of the private equity industry).
186. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A,
Investment Company Act Release No. 18,612 (Mar. 12, 1992) (setting out
15% limit on holdings of restricted securities or other assets not having readily available market quotations, an increase from the 10% limit previously in
effect).
187. See Partnoy, supra note 184.
188. For a normative analysis of this phenomenon, see Jeff Schwartz,
Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s
Investments in Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95
N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017).
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offer private equity as an investment option.189 In effect, this
allows public investors to route retirement savings into private
equity funds; those funds can, in turn, invest freely in private
companies. This move was endorsed by SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton and fit with the agency’s broader agenda at the time of
allowing “main street” investors to access the private markets.190 This development was foreshadowed by legal changes
from 2006, which narrowed the scope of ERISA restrictions
and gave more public pension plans access to private equity.191
(6) Regulation-Lite Regimes: The JOBS Act also created a
new, time-limited category, the Emerging Growth Company,
which is subject to what the SEC calls “scaled” regulation, in an
effort to induce companies to go public.192 If they qualify
based on certain thresholds, newly-public companies in the
first five years of their lifecycle are subject to less regulation.193
Separately, the “smaller reporting company” category allows
certain companies that are publicly traded to avoid public
company regulation based on size thresholds related to shares
outstanding and revenues.194 Regulation A+ IPOs, discussed
under item (2) above, are another prominent example. The
SEC has been raising the applicable qualification thresholds
during the 2010s, thereby increasing the number of companies subject to such regulation-lite regimes.
189. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Div. of Fiduciary Interpretations, Opinion Letter (June 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/3o1Eflz.
190. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Lab., U.S. Department of Labor Issues Information Letter on Private Equity Investments (June 3, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3xwLncQ. The press release quotes SEC Chairman Jay Clayton praising the move because it would “provide our long-term Main Street
investors with a choice of professionally managed funds that more closely
match the diversified public and private market asset allocation strategies
pursued by many well-managed pension funds as well as the benefit of selection and monitoring by ERISA fiduciaries.” Id.
191. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat.
780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
192. See Emerging Growth Companies, U.S. SEC. EXCH. & COMM’N., https://
www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC (last modified July 24, 2019).
For an academic analysis, see Jeff Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled
Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 347 (2014) (discussing the mechanics
and effects of scaled securities regulation).
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2) (setting out registration requirements for
EGCs); JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306, §§ 102–104 (2012).
194. See Smaller Reporting Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/SRC (last modified Mar. 15, 2021).
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C. Capital Raising in 2021 vs. 2000: An Illustration
Taken together, the changes discussed in Section II.B
have transformed the capital raising regulatory regime.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphic illustration by showing the
functional changes between the applicable regulatory framework before the 2000s and the applicable regulatory framework in 2021.
FIGURE 2: SIMPLIFIED OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL RAISING
REGULATORY REGIME BEFORE THE 2000S
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FIGURE 3: SIMPLIFIED OVERVIEW OF THE CAPITAL RAISING
REGULATORY REGIME IN 2021
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As illustrated by Figure 2, before the 2000s, public companies sat at the center of the capital markets. Most capital was
public capital (invested through the public markets). The public markets were also the primary way public companies financed themselves. The private (i.e., unregulated) markets
were small and underdeveloped. Public companies could finance themselves through private capital in very limited circumstances.195 Moreover, public capital generally could not
flow to private companies. Private companies had to finance
themselves with private capital, but the smaller size of the private capital pool made this a limited option. If a private company wanted to grow, it had to gain access to public capital by
going through the traditional IPO process discussed in Section
I.B.2. And, once public, it was virtually impossible for a public
company to revert to private company status. As shown in Figure 2, going public was a one way street.
Figure 3, which illustrates today’s capital raising regulatory regime, paints an altogether different picture. As a result
of the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s discussed in Section
II.B, the pool of private capital is substantially expanded, and,
in addition, public capital can easily morph into private capital. Private companies can benefit from this expanded pool of
private capital and, in addition, can now also receive public
capital. This makes the need to go public—and enter the regulated realm—much less urgent and may indeed obviate it. By
raising ever-greater amounts of private capital, private companies can take on “unicorn” status and look very similar to public companies, but without the attendant regulatory obligations. When unicorns do decide to go public, they can do so
via an IPO (or direct listing), but, importantly, this decision is
now much easier to reverse through a delisting: going public is
a two-way street. Moreover, the flow of capital between public
markets and public companies is also bidirectional because of
the buyback phenomenon, whereby significant amounts of
capital are returned to shareholders.196 There is another
195. So-called PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity) transactions represent the most prominent example. For a description of PIPE transactions, see Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1598–1601.
196. See Matt Phillips, This Stock Market Rally Has Everything, Except Investors,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://nyti.ms/3o04fOc; see also infra Appendix,
Figure A–9 (showing the substantial rise in stock buybacks in the United
States during the 2010s).
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prominent source of capital for private firms, which is not
shown in Figure 3: private firms’ own equity, which they use to
cover more and more of their labor costs. As discussed in Section I.B.1, unicorns pay for human capital by granting employees stock and stock options. Their ability to do so further diminishes the importance of public markets as a source of capital.
Compare the two figures: The streamlined nature of Figure 2 highlights the fact that before the 2000s, there was a divide between public and private capital (even if it was somewhat porous). By contrast, no such divide can be observed in
Figure 3. Public capital flows freely into both public and private companies; private capital, which is now greater in size
due to deregulatory developments, can also flow freely into
both public and private companies. In effect, public and private capital and public and private markets have now become
fungible for a large subset of firms seeking financing.
D. The Fungibility of Public and Private Capital
In response to the changes in capital formation practices
in recent years, the widely-followed financial commentator
Matt Levine has observed that “the private markets are the new
public markets.”197 One way to interpret this statement is that
public capital and private capital have become fungible. But
recall that the structure of the current public company regulatory regime is premised on the separation, or non-fungibility,
of public and private capital.
The regulatory cascade has facilitated the flow of capital
among public and private investors, public and private companies, and public and private markets. Functionally, capital is
now free-flowing: what used to be hard regulatory prohibitions
are now merely compliance items. A private company can enjoy the same access to finance as a public company by hiring
bankers and lawyers to structure capital raising transactions in
ways that comply with a complex set of exemptions, carve-outs,
and capital raising formalities. Problematically, this state of affairs is actually worse than a universe where capital truly flows
freely, since the vestigial regulations are mere formalities that
can be avoided, but at the cost of hiring investment bankers
197. See Matt Levine, Private Markets Might Be Too Nice, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
31, 2019), https://bloom.bg/3CVM4O4.
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and lawyers. In other words, for a firm determined to avoid
public company regulation, the securities laws have come to be
little more than transaction costs.
Unsurprisingly, public capital raised on public markets is
becoming increasingly irrelevant; instead, public markets are
more important for the purpose of providing liquidity and adjusting the investor base than for raising new capital. Consider
again the contrast between newer- and older-generation tech
companies. The implied valuation of Uber in the private market was significantly higher than the total value created in the
IPO.198 For a long time, the company’s actual market capitalization was below what its initial IPO price indicated.199 In
other words, Uber was built on the private markets, and the
public markets were not a part of Uber’s growth story. By contrast, as of August 2020 virtually none of Amazon’s $1.3 trillion
in market capitalization was raised in the private markets, and
only 3% of the value created by Alphabet/Google, and 17% of
the value created by Facebook, was raised in the private markets.200
III.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
PUBLIC–PRIVATE DIVIDE
In the aggregate, the myriad of legal interventions described in Part II have led to the breakdown of the foundational public–private divide in securities law. But the fact that
the transformation of the legal framework for capital raising
has been dramatic does not automatically suggest that the resulting regulatory landscape is problematic. This Part makes
the case that it is. As we will see, the breakdown of the public–private divide and the resulting public company regulatory
paradox have had significant adverse consequences along four
dimensions. The first two are primarily conceptual: Securities
law has gone from a mandatory regulatory scheme to one that
is largely elective and subject to “issuer choice,” which, in turn,
198. See Mike Isaac et al., How the Promise of a $120 Billion Uber I.P.O. Evaporated, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://nyti.ms/32IjFP5.
199. See Annie Palmer, Uber Falls to All-Time Low as Investors Grow More Skeptical, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2019), https://cnb.cx/3xxhmJQ.
200. Matt Levine, Public Markets Don’t Matter Like They Used To, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://bloom.bg/3E4Szzh.
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has diminished the federal government’s ability to regulate
certain types of economic activity through securities law. The
third and fourth sets of consequences pertain to important
constituencies: The breakdown of the public–private divide
has led to the fragmentation of investor protection across the
capital markets and, in addition, it has increased the vulnerability of employee-investors. Whereas prior manifestations of
the latter two developments have received attention in the academic literature, the first two developments have largely escaped notice.
A. Elective Regulation, Quasi-Federalization, and “Issuer Choice”
The mandatory nature of securities regulation, particularly following the 1964 expansion of the Exchange Act
through the addition of Section 12(g), has long been subject
to critical scrutiny in the legal and finance literature. At its
core, the classic case in favor of mandatory disclosure is based
on a market failure argument: in the absence of a government
mandate, firms cannot be expected to reveal the information,
both positive and negative, that investors need in order to make
investment decisions.201 Law-and-economics scholars have
countered by arguing that capital market efficiency obviates
the need for the mandatory disclosure regime, since market
forces, notably the competition for scarce investor capital, will
induce firms to provide the requisite information.202 Researchers have conducted numerous empirical studies seeking to assess the relative benefits of public company regulation via
mandatory disclosure requirements.203
Some of the most concerted and well-known arguments
against mandatory securities disclosure are associated with
201. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 747 (1984).
202. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 928
(1994).
203. See, e.g., George J. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of
Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 30, 42 (1977) (expressing skepticism about the benefits of mandatory
securities disclosure); Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, The Economics of
Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future
Research, 54 J. ACCT. RSCH. 525 (2016) (reviewing a large sample of empirical
studies of disclosure regulation).
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Roberta Romano, who made a forceful case against regulation
in a 1998 article. Romano found that “little empirical evidence
suggests that the federal [securities regulation] regime has affirmatively benefited investors,” which led her to argue in
favor of investor empowerment via “issuer choice”—a system
whereby there are a variety of different regulatory frameworks
on offer and firms decide whether or not to opt into securities
regulation.204 Romano’s article gave rise to one of the most
prominent academic debates in securities regulation, which in
essence was a debate about the very need for such regulation.205 Even though the vast majority of scholars have been
supportive of some form of mandatory securities regulation,206
this debate was never settled. The issuer choice idea, however,
fell by the wayside in the early 2000s as a result of new market
developments that were both unexpected and inconvenient:
the dot-com crash and the accounting scandals of the early
2000s.
These market developments stymied whatever interest
there may have existed in scaling back securities regulation.
Instead of regulatory retrenchment, the federal response to
204. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2372 (1998).
205. For a direct rejoinder to Romano, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (arguing in favor of mandatory disclosure and interpreting empirical evidence as supportive of this position). The debate between Romano and Fox continued over the next few years. See Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2001). Many other scholars wrote about this
debate or some aspect of it. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not
Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 282–84 (2000) (proposing a system allowing sophisticated investors to decide what, if any, disclosure they require); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000) (criticizing securities regulation via the mandatory disclosure regime on behavioral grounds); Edward
Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002) (updating the case in
favor of a mandatory securities disclosure regime).
206. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An
Overview Essay, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 95, 96
(Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (reporting a “consensus” among most academics and regulators, premised on disclosure’s benefits for the efficient
pricing of securities, and “practical concerns associated with the governance
and regulation of public companies”).
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the accounting scandals was the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which
represented the most significant expansion of federal securities regulation since the 1930s. The reigning debate in securities law soon became about the new regulatory reality—described as the “federalization” of corporate governance—and
its merits and demerits.207 The passage of another ambitious
federal bill, the Dodd–Frank Act, less than a decade later expanded federal corporate governance even further and reinforced these concerns.208
Today’s regulatory reality, epitomized by the breakdown
of the public–private divide, is different and it disrupts the federalization narrative. While it is certainly true that
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank “federalized” a number of
matters of corporate governance that had previously been
within the exclusive purview of state corporate law, it is important to remember that these laws’ provisions have always applied only to public companies. At the time when public company status (and the access to public capital via the plentiful
public markets it provided) was essential to corporate success,
the federalization label was accurate as a descriptive matter.
With very limited exceptions,209 the choice to go public was
not much of a choice, since access to public capital was a prerequisite for growth.
As described in Section II.B, however, the deregulatory
cascade of the 2010s has transformed the funding landscape
for U.S. firms. The virtually-unlimited availability of private
capital, and the new rules allowing public capital to flow into
private firms, renders “going public” truly a choice rather than
207. See Romano, supra note 138; Langevoort, supra note 140; John C.
Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS.
91 (2007).
208. See Bainbridge, supra note 139. While the larger point about the federalization effects of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank still stands, it is also
useful to remember that most of the provisions in these statutes did not displace or override already-existing state corporate law rules; rather, the provisions sought to fill regulatory gaps in state corporate law.
209. The relevant exceptions are a few large, mostly family-owned firms
that never went public, including Cargill, Koch Industries, Albertsons, and
Mars. Professional firms, such as Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and
Ernst & Young have also been private traditionally. See Chloe Sorvino, Silent
Giant: America’s Biggest Private Company Reveals Its Plan To Get Even Bigger,
FORBES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/3cXfuAH (listing the largest private
companies other than unicorns).
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an imperative. As private companies, unicorns are not subject to
federal corporate governance notwithstanding their size, large
investor base (which increasingly includes retail investors),
and societal footprint. The federalization label, therefore, is
no longer apt. Instead, it is more accurate to speak about
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank as causing partial or quasifederalization: These laws have added a federal corporate law
layer on top of the state law provisions for some firms in the
economy, but definitely not for all firms. What is more, the
subset of firms to which the federal layer applies is driven by
private ordering, not mandatory regulation.210 Despite the
considerable time and effort Congress and the SEC have devoted to developing the federal corporate governance regime
over the course of almost nine decades, the federal government has no means to force a firm into the regime.
The latter observation takes us back, and full circle, to the
notion of issuer choice and the academic debates related to it
before the advent of Sarbanes–Oxley. Even though the merits
of the issuer choice model remain contested in the academic
literature, the breakdown of the public–private divide has
brought about, quietly but surely, the realization of Roberta
Romano’s intellectually-ambitious vision for elective federal securities regulation. In effect, the provisions of the federal securities laws are mandatory, but only after an issuer has elected to
opt into the regime by taking on public company status.
Whether to do so is—to echo Romano’s phrase—the issuer’s
choice.
The suggestion that changes in federal securities law over
the past two decades have brought about an issuer choice
model is an important but overlooked point in the assessment
of securities law’s recent trajectory. To be sure, issuer choice is
not an implausible model and one can imagine a set of circumstances under which it could garner political support and
become formally embedded in law. What is notable here, however, is that issuer choice was never mentioned in debates over
the JOBS Act and the initiatives that comprised the deregu210. Recall that there is only one provision that “forces” a firm into public
company status, Section 12(g), which has little practical effect. See supra
notes 77–78 and accompanying text. As discussed in Section IV.A.3, one of
the most clearly fleshed out reform proposals coming out of the SEC focuses
on reforming this very provision.
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latory cascade detailed in Section II.B. In other words, the issuer choice model was not subjected to democratic scrutiny
and did not win a battle of policy ideas. Instead, the issuer
choice outcome is simply an unintended consequence of the
breakdown of the public–private divide in securities law.
B. Securities Law’s Diminished Regulatory Capacity
As discussed in Section I.C, over the years, securities regulation has come to fulfill important roles in ensuring corporate transparency and accountability, in addition to investor
protection and capital formation.211 Firm-specific information
released pursuant to the requirements of the mandatory securities disclosure regime provides a window into corporate activity that is useful not just to investors but also to employees,
customers, suppliers, competitors, and society at large.212
From the vantage point of federal lawmaking, securities
law via disclosure mandates provides a relatively easy channel
for adopting general economic regulation: the “public company” regulatory category is already in existence, as is the disclosure regime and the powerful regulator in charge of it, the
SEC. Accordingly, and as we saw in Section I.C, Congress has
used the securities laws to require disclosure pertaining to various miscellaneous topics, such as conflict minerals, extractive
payments, mine safety, corporate pay equity, and corporate activity in countries under economic sanctions, such as Iran.213
Proposed legislation would use the public company category
to impose a variety of disclosure obligations pertaining to ESG
topics.214 Nevertheless, the optimal volume of disclosure obligations and the scope of the disclosure regime are heavily contested,215 and usually hinge on one’s policy preferences.
Irrespective of the policy choices on the latter points, the
breakdown of the public–private divide has undermined the
211. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose, supra note 79, at 652–54.
213. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
214. See Corporate Governance Improvement and Investor Protection Act,
H.R. 1187, 117th Cong. (2021).
215. Compare Jill Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO.
L. J. 923 (2019) (arguing in favor of securities disclosure mandates on sustainability-related topics), with Amanda M. Rose, A Response to Calls for SECMandated ESG Disclosure, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1821 (2021) (arguing against
the expansion of the disclosure regime to cover ESG topics).
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regulatory capacity of securities law: young firms can now
avoid important disclosure and governance mandates by never
going public, whereas already-public firms can go private or
sell “bad” assets off to a private company. As long as the public
company category is elective, the federal government cannot
use it to effectively regulate business activities and practices it
has deemed undesirable.216
Climate change regulation provides a case in point. There
has been a powerful push in the Biden administration to mobilize all federal administrative agencies, including the SEC, to
address climate change.217 In the case of the SEC, this will
likely entail adopting new disclosure rules concerning firms’
activities that might contribute to climate change and the risks
firms face due to climate change—rules that are subject to
considerable controversy.218 Importantly, under the current
regulatory framework any new SEC disclosure rules would apply only to public companies. This fact would not be problematic if all the biggest polluters were public companies, but it
turns out that the opposite is the case. According to a recent
report, small, non-public oil and gas drilling companies have
become the biggest polluters in the United States in terms of
methane and other greenhouse gases.219 The report notes that
these firms’ pollution is “wildly large relative to their production” and that the firms have escaped the type of public scrutiny leveled on large oil and gas companies, even though in
216. The manifestations and implications of this phenomenon deserve
more detailed treatment, which I provide in related work. See George S. Georgiev, Is “Public Company” Still a Viable Regulatory Category?, 13 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1 (forthcoming 2022) (draft on file with author) [hereinafter Georgiev,
Regulatory Category].
217. See Exec. Order No. 14,030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,967 (May 25, 2021) (announcing a policy to “advance consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and
accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk”); see also Exec. Order
No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Feb. 1, 2021) (announcing a “governmentwide” approach to climate change mitigation).
218. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 215 (opposing climate change disclosure
rules on materiality and institutional competency grounds). For arguments
in favor of climate change disclosure mandates on the grounds that they are
consistent with the SEC’s mission, including investor protection and the unjustifiably-neglected goal of promoting competition, see George S. Georgiev,
Comment Letter to the SEC on Climate Change and Other ESG Disclosure
(June 22, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3874186.
219. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Here Are America’s Top Methane Emitters. Some Will
Surprise You, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2021), https://nyti.ms/317ur0t.
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many cases the small private polluters have bought their highpolluting assets from larger public companies.220 This reallocation of high-polluting assets is a win–win proposition for the
firms, if not for the public. In effect, the large public companies are “cleaning up” their investor- and public-facing disclosure reports by offloading the problematic assets and freeing
up financial capital. The small private companies, in turn, get
to exploit the same assets with little public oversight, without
incurring reputational harm, and, most likely, without paying
a higher cost of capital.
The upshot of this example is that private firms like the
smaller high-polluting firms can avoid important climate
change disclosure rules at the federal level by simply avoiding
the public capital markets and public company status.221 As we
saw in Part II, the deregulatory cascade of the 2010s and the
wide availability of private capital make this a feasible option.
The negative implications are twofold. First, government regulation by way of SEC disclosure mandates fails to capture a significant segment of entities across the economy. In this regard,
the ready opportunities for regulatory arbitrage result in an
adverse selection problem—the rules fail to cover precisely the
types of firms to which they are most relevant. Second, because
a growing number of public investors can now invest in private
firms not subject to SEC disclosure obligations, those public
investors would not obtain disclosure in respect of their pri220. Id. This trend is projected to continue and intensify over time. The
report notes that by the end of the 2020s, “the world’s largest oil and gas
companies will divest from more than $100 billion of assets as they adjust to
the [clean] energy transition.” Id.
221. To be sure, other federal agencies have the power to require disclosure of all firms, not just public companies. The point here is about the
diminished regulatory capacity of securities law, which in recent years has
been a preferred vehicle for seeking to impose new economic regulation.
During the 116th Congress, between 2019 and 2021, there were 18 unique
bills that sought to regulate various aspects of general economic activity via
the public company regulatory category. These bills pertained to matters
such as employee representation in corporate governance and disclosure
concerning diversity in corporate leadership, human capital management,
the value of digital assets, corporate political spending, outsourcing practices, internal compensation trends, ESG metrics, cybersecurity risk and internal cybersecurity expertise, financial dealings with firearms manufacturers, measures taken to address illegal activities in the supply chain, and various other topics. See Georgiev, Regulatory Category, supra note 216
(manuscript at 13–17).
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vate company investment and would not reap the investor protection benefits of the rules. The latter point illustrates the
fragmentation of investor protection due to the breakdown of
the public–private divide, a topic to which we turn next.
C. Fragmented Investor Protection
Perhaps the most immediate question raised by the
changes in public and private markets relates to the impact of
these changes on investor protection. Accordingly, scholars
who have written about the underlying developments have
considered their implications for investor protection rigorously and from different perspectives.222 The analysis that follows builds upon this fine work, but it takes a somewhat different conceptual approach. As a point of departure, I inquire
into the systemic impact of the breakdown of the public–private divide on investor protection (rather than the impact of specific private capital developments). I also assess investor protection at the portfolio level under the assumption that
mainstream investors’ portfolios today include a mix of public
and private firms as a result of the various deregulatory measures discussed in Part II.
Viewed systemically and at the portfolio level, the impact
of the breakdown of the public–private divide on investor protection can be described as the fragmentation of investor protection. Fragmentation is an apt label because different components of the portfolio are subject to different degrees of investor protection: whereas public companies (whose securities
would still comprise the largest share of a capitalizationweighted fully-diversified portfolio) are subject to the expansive regulatory scheme described in Section I.C.1, private companies (whose securities would comprise a smaller but steadily
increasing share of the portfolio) remain unregulated. As
noted in Section I.C.2, there are different ways to define investor protection,223 but, notably, the point about fragmentation
applies regardless of the chosen definition. As long as legal
interventions applying to public companies offer a degree of
protection that has been deemed necessary for the protection
222. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353
(2020); Winship, supra note 7; Alon-Beck, supra note 171; see also sources
cited in Section IV.A infra.
223. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
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of mainstream investors, then exposing these investors to both
public and private firms diminishes the overall level of investor
protection within the portfolio.
Despite the rhetoric about “investor opportunity” which is
usually tied to a quest for higher returns,224 it is at best unclear
that mixing public and private firms in the portfolio contributes to higher returns. Empirical evidence shows that private
markets, on average, do not outperform public markets in
terms of investor returns.225 Relatedly, the track record of unregulated IPOs under Regulation A+ has been dismal.226
Expanding investor opportunity should not occur at the
expense of overriding investor choice, but this may be one unintended consequence of the breakdown of the public–private
divide. Because private company securities are finding their
way into the diversified funds that comprise a majority of
401(k) retirement savings, it would be very difficult (or, in the
very least, it would be burdensome) for an investor to exclude
private companies from the portfolio even if this were a deliberate strategy based on an informed choice. The entry of private company securities into the investments of “public” investors is not a remote possibility but a reality. The big-three asset
managers already invest in private companies and the biggest
of them, BlackRock, has recently indicated plans for further
expanding its investment in private company equity.227 (While
224. See supra note 169.
225. See Erik F. Gerding, The Cost to Retail Investors and Public Markets of
“Harmonizing” Securities Offering Exemptions, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://bit.ly/3Ix9n4D (providing a detailed overview of relevant studies and concluding that “[t]he best evidence suggests that, on average, even institutional investors may be doing no better in the private markets than
they would investing in a broad index of public securities”) (emphasis in original).
226. See, e.g., Leo Imasuen, Most Regulation A+ IPOs Are Outright Uninvestable, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://bit.ly/3qlupv5. Crowdfunding
represents a relatively similar method of capital raising, but data on profitability is more limited. Because of the relatively modest amounts raised, both
Regulation A+ IPOs and crowdfunding fall outside the scope of this Article.
Conceptually, crowdfunding also has implications for the public–private divide. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide
in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 503 (2014) (“An analysis
of the regulation of [crowdfunded] offerings of securities . . . exposes new
and emerging complexity in distinguishing between public and private offerings . . . and between public and private companies . . . .”).
227. See, e.g., Simon Jessop & Ross Kerber, Insurers Plan to Ramp Up Private
Market Investments, BlackRock Says, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2021), https://reut.rs/
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there is an academic case to be made for diversification along
related lines, it assumes legitimate variation in legal arrangements rather than what is in effect regulatory arbitrage.228)
What are the harms of allowing investors who, in the
words of the Supreme Court, “cannot fend for themselves,” to
invest in public firms? The classic story with respect to the merits of public markets as opposed to private markets relates to
the advantages of public markets in terms of price discovery,
liquidity, and information quality.229 The harms of holding
both private and public company securities are many, but perhaps the most significant one relates to private markets’ reduced capacity to value firms accurately compared to public
markets. The price at which an investor buys or sells a security
is the most important term in a securities transaction, which
makes stock price accuracy a key element of investor protection.230 Private markets are inferior in pricing to public markets. According to Jesse Fried and Jeff Gordon, structural features of private markets, particularly tech startups in Silicon
Valley, contribute to valuation and governance bubbles.231
They note that “[a] market that makes it difficult and costly to
express negative sentiments is prone to a bubble and thus an
abrupt collapse when negative fundamentals finally become
too pervasive to ignore.”232
3EB8JAG; see also supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing Fidelity’s investment in Juul).
228. Kelli Alces has made such an argument, though her approach does
not call for mixing public and private companies, but, rather companies with
different legal arrangements. See Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversification, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 1977 (2013) (explaining that “[l]egal diversification
protects investors from the risk that a particular method of minimizing
agency costs will prove ineffective”).
229. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 201, at 747.
230. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 370–81 (2003); see also
Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects of Mandated Disclosure, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
369, 372 (2004) (providing an assessment of the various empirical studies
and noting that “[t]he concept of stock price accuracy is well accepted and
commonly employed in the accounting and finance literature”); see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977 (1992).
231. See Jesse M. Fried & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Valuation and Governance
Bubbles of Silicon Valley, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3rk1glU.
232. Id.
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Empirical evidence bears this out. According to a Morgan
Stanley report, “[v]aluing young companies is an inherently
tricky task.”233 The same report notes the results of a 2020 survey of venture capitalists on unicorn valuations: more than
90% of the respondents believed that unicorns were “‘significantly’ overvalued,” even though 40% of them had themselves
invested in unicorns.234 On an aggregate level, the report also
notes that in the period between 2011 and 2019, “about onethird of the companies that went public had a valuation below
that implied by the final round of private financing.”235
At a most basic level, accurate asset prices are key to investor protection and without a public listing, asset prices cannot
be guaranteed to be accurate.236 Relatedly, the rise of private
markets inhabited by private firms that do not produce public
disclosure reduces the overall level of firm-specific information that is available to market participants, which has the potential to affect the accuracy of securities prices for public
firms.237 The investor protection harms, in other words, are
not limited to investors in private firms, but, rather, extend
systemically across all capital markets. As a result, the diminished availability of information about private firms due to the
rise of private capital has significant implications for allocative
efficiency in the overall economy.
There is also the potential for investor losses due to poor
corporate governance, inadequate information, and poor
monitoring, as illustrated by the cases of WeWork, Uber, Theranos, and others.238 At each of these companies, there were
233. See MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN STANLEY, PUBPRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM LOOK 48 (2020),
https://mgstn.ly/31CaMpV.
234. Id. at 47–48.
235. Id. at 47.
236. See James J. Park, Investor Protection in an Age of Entrepreneurship, HARV.
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911454;
Holger Spamann, Indirect Investor Protection: The Investment Ecosystem and Its
Legal Underpinnings (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 594/
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3707249.
237. See de Fontenay, supra note 22.
238. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra
Section IV.A. For an additional analysis of the investor protection implications, see Ann Lipton, The Eroding Public/Private Distinction, BUS. L. PROF.
BLOG (Feb. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3DukFTw. For a contrarian analysis, see
Platt, infra note 247.
LIC TO
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governance failures despite the involvement of sophisticated
venture capital and other institutional investors. Contrary to
what we might expect by simply analyzing those investors’ incentives, they did not bargain for information or exercise oversight in an effective manner. It appears likely that these firms’
private status contributed to their governance problems. As is
so often the case in corporate law, however, the counterfactual, whether public company status would have prevented the
associated scandals, cannot be proven. But on balance, it does
appear that, at least for large firms, public company status is
more conducive to better governance (with all the associated
benefits in terms of mitigating fraud and waste) than private
company status.
There are two additional considerations. First, public markets may provide firms with greater resilience in times of crisis.
The availability of private capital is more cyclical and private
markets remain smaller overall; they are less liquid even during the best of times. Therefore, a regulatory policy that encourages firms to take on public company status may offer systemic benefits in terms of firms’ ability to access capital when
they experience distress. The second consideration relates to
diversification. Diversification is key to maximizing risk-adjusted returns. Yet, it is considerably more difficult for individual investors constructing an individual portfolio to diversity
effectively with private securities, because there is significantly
less information available about private companies and because of the diminished liquidity of private company securities.
D. Increased Vulnerability of Employee-Investors
In addition to mainstream investors, the breakdown of
the public–private divide compounds the problems faced by a
special class of investors—employees of startup companies
who usually receive a considerable amount of their total compensation in illiquid and hard-to-value private company stock
and who are incapable of mitigating through diversification
the firm-specific risk associated with their investment of both
financial and human capital.239 As discussed in Parts I and II,
changes to industry practices as well as various economic and
239. See, e.g., Yifat Aran, Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees, 2019
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 867 (2019).
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regulatory changes from the past two decades have complicated the economic relationship between certain firms and
their employees, giving rise to a hybrid economic actor: the
employee-investor.
In the case of unicorns, stock options are a source of significant and well-documented problems relating to valuation,
tax, contracting, lack of liquidity, and other matters.240 Comprehensive data on employee ownership stakes in unicorns is
lacking, but it is generally assumed that in late-stage startups
approximately 15% of the market capitalization is reserved for
employees.241 An examination of headcount data from the
current cohort of U.S.-based unicorns shows that 112 of them
have 1000 or more employees, and a further 141 have between
500 and 999 employees.242 Applying the general rule of thumb
that approximately 80% of startup employees receive stock options, it stands to reason that there are hundreds of thousands
of startup employees who are exposed to the stock of their employers. From a firm’s point of view, trading equity capital for
human capital is an attractive financial proposition, because it
diminishes the need to seek external financing and delays the
going-public decision, as discussed in Section I.B.1. Moreover,
as discussed in Section I.B.2, employee-investors do not count
for purposes of the mandatory registration thresholds under
Section 12(g).
Unlike in the past, these problems are no longer capped
in size or duration, because startups can now raise unlimited
amounts of private capital (larger private startups tend to have
more employee-investors) and because they can remain private, and unregulated from an investor-protection point of
view, virtually indefinitely. As a result, the unique problems
faced by employees investing in the stock of their employer are
compounded. In the case of an employee receiving stock options as part of their compensation, the employee repeatedly
has to make at least three types of difficult and highly conse240. See, e.g., Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options—Golden Goose or Trojan
Horse?, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107 (2019).
241. See Alexander Davis, IPO Bonanza Leaves Out Some Tech Workers Over
Unexercised Stock Options, PITCHBOOK (Dec. 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3dton5h
(quoting an estimate from a compensation expert).
242. Author’s calculations based on data from PitchBook as of December
5, 2021. Aggregate data on unicorn headcount and the evolution of unicorn
headcount over time is not available publicly.
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quential investment decisions: (1) trading their human capital
for stock options (a process which implicitly assigns a net present value to the stock option investment); (2) holding on to
the stock options by continuing their employment at the company, or, if they decide to terminate their employment, either
forfeiting the stock options or paying an exercise price plus
applicable taxes within a limited period post-termination; and
(3) deciding whether to exercise the options prior to their expiration date. The more human capital an employee trades in
for stock options, the more consequential and risky the latter
two decisions become. And, for each of these three types of
decisions, an employee needs sufficient information about the
firm’s long-term prospects, which is not always available or
forthcoming.243
It is important to keep in mind that all of the harms pertaining to investors discussed in Section III.C apply here as
well. Moreover, the issue is not limited to the missed benefits
of public company regulation and diversification. To the extent that there is a greater incidence of fraud at private companies, such fraud harms employee-investors disproportionately.244 In short, employee-investors are exposed to both the
harms faced by a firm’s employees and the harms faced by a
firm’s investors.
IV.
REFORMS: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES AND ROADBLOCKS
As documented in Part II, the regulatory system governing firms’ capital raising activities—the types of capital,
types of investors, and types of markets that different types of
firms can access if they undertake certain legal obligations—is
in a state of flux. This stands in contrast with the ordered nature of the original system described in Part I: public firms
raising public capital from public investors on the public markets, and private firms obtaining private capital from a narrow
class of qualified investors through the much-smaller private
markets. As we saw in Part III, the implications of this change,
243. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature
Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613 (2017).
244. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1887 (2013) (discussing the significant and idiosyncratic costs of corporate fraud for non-investor constituencies, including employees).
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heretofore largely unacknowledged, are far-reaching and impact multiple constituencies both within and outside the firm.
Regulatory flux and incoherence can be lasting conditions, though hopefully not permanent ones. Even though
some observers believe that the capital markets are over-regulated,245 whereas others believe that they are under-regulated,246 both groups are likely to agree that capital markets
today are mis-regulated.247 If and when change becomes possible, what might it look like? What are the roadblocks to reform
and can they be overcome? The discussion that follows outlines two conceptual approaches—rebuilding the public–private divide and lowering the stakes in capital raising decisions by circumventing the public–private divide and shifting
some of the economic regulation that currently operates
through securities law to other regulatory domains.
Instead of endorsing a specific proposal or set of proposals, this Article analyzes the preconditions for reform and then
argues in favor of new deliberative mechanisms for determining the optimal structure of securities regulation in the wake
of the breakdown of the public–private divide.
245. See, e.g., Center for Capital Market Competitiveness, Comment Letter
on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193319192490.pdf (urging substantial further deregulation consistent with the
Chamber of Commerce’s “longstanding effort to examine how SEC regulatory burdens may diminish access to capital and to remove those barriers”).
246. See, e.g., Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Erik Gerding, et al., Securities Law
Professor Comment Letter on Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-08-19/s70819-6193340-192501.pdf (criticizing the rise of private capital
and arguing against further deregulation by way of capital raising exemptions).
247. There is also a case for avoiding reforms in either direction. Some
academics have recently pushed back against the prevailing critical views of
the rise of private capital, and of unicorns in particular. See, e.g., Alexander I.
Platt, Unicorniphobia, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3915793 (expressing skepticism about arguments that
unicorns pose investor protection and other problems, as well as about the
expected efficacy of the policy interventions proposed by other scholars);
Abraham J.B. Cable, Time Enough for Counting: A Unicorn Retrospective, YALE J.
ON REG. (BULLETIN), Sept. 21, 2021, https://bit.ly/3D0BCF7 (analyzing the
investment outcomes of 32 “original” unicorns and suggesting that “private
ordering by founders, employees, and investors is proving an effective alternative to ambitious regulatory reform”).
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A. Rebuilding the Public–Private Divide
While a complete picture of the breakdown of the public–private divide, along with its causes and consequences, is
just emerging, a number of observers have analyzed the various changes in capital markets occurring during the 2010s and
offered a range of discrete reform recommendations. From
the vantage point of the public–private divide, these reform
proposals can be classified into two general categories: (1) increasing regulation in the private realm in order to solve various investor-protection problems resulting from the changes
in the capital markets ecosystem discussed in Part II; and (2)
changing regulation to expand the public realm. One idea in
the latter category—the “shareholders of record” solution proposed in October 2021 by SEC Commissioner Allison Herren
Lee—deserves special attention both because of its sweeping
nature and because the SEC can implement it fairly easily by
acting on its existing authority, without the need for additional
congressional action.
1. Regulating the Private Realm
As a point of departure, the analyses that fall within this
rubric do not take a categorical stance against the rise of private capital markets and the expansion of the private realm,
along with the key underlying phenomena: the rise of unicorns, the greater equity stakes held by private company employee-investors, and the expanded opportunities for retail investor participation in private company capital raising. Recognizing various problems caused by these phenomena, however,
commentators have offered proposals for increasing the regulation of the newly-expanded private realm.
The reforms in respect of regulation of the private realm
include the creation of special disclosure regimes for unicorns,248 requiring additional disclosure for the benefit of em248. See Jennifer Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private
Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 585 (2016) (arguing that “once a private company reaches unicorn status, it should be subject to some of the same reporting obligations as public companies to provide greater transparency and protect minority stockholders”); see also Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in
the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic
Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151 (2013) (arguing for expanded disclosure requirements for certain large private companies). For an early and prescient analysis of emerging problems in private markets, see Elizabeth Pollman, Informa-
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ployee-investors in private companies,249 whistleblower protections for private company employees,250 more stringent enforcement of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws,
which apply to private companies,251 facilitating trading of private company securities in order to improve stock price accuracy,252 and placing regulatory restrictions on trading in the
absence of adequate disclosure.253
The key advantage of these proposals is that they offer
one or more targeted solutions, which facilitates both assessment and implementation; a potential downside is that they
each focus on a subset of the problems caused by the breakdown of the public–private divide and that the suggested interventions, while targeted, are not systemic. These proposals
merit careful consideration during future policymaking
rounds and should form a core part of the broad deliberative
process envisioned by Section IV.C.
2. Expanding the Public Realm
Instead of regulating the private realm directly, it is also
possible to intervene by expanding the size of the public
realm, which will, in turn, shrink the private realm. Under this
approach, the number of entities subject to the already-existing regime for regulating public companies would increase,
while the number of entities that fall in the unregulated private realm would decrease. To achieve this, commentators
have suggested, for example, to require or nudge late-stage
private companies to take on public company status.254 Changing the definition of the term “shareholder of record,” a protion Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 222 (2012) (discussing
the rise of secondary markets for private company securities and arguing
that the SEC should require “a specified minimum level of disclosure” for
trading in such markets).
249. See Aran, supra note 239; Alon-Beck, supra note 171.
250. See Winship, supra note 7.
251. See Pollman, supra note 222; Winship, supra note 7.
252. See Matthew Wansley, Taming Unicorns, 97 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3801131.
253. See Jones, supra note 105, at 186–87 (“Policymakers can act by restricting trading in Unicorn shares in the absence of adequate disclosure.”).
254. See Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale, Corporate Adolescence: Why
Did “We” Not Work?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1382 (2021); Amy Deen Westbrook, We’(re) Working on Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Vulnerability in Unicorn Companies, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 505, 570 (2021).
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posal discussed in detail in Section IV.A.3 below, offers a blunt
and automatic solution to expanding the public realm; these
attributes work both in the proposal’s favor and against it.
Apart from the “shareholders of record” solution, the mechanics associated with expanding the public realm are complex
and uncertain. Moreover, implementation would require congressional action, which is highly unlikely absent a crisis (as
discussed further in Section IV.C below).
A report from the Global Financial Markets Center at
Duke Law School published in February 2021 offers an illustration of various possible ways to expand the public realm.255
The report suggests that “all large companies [ought to be]
public,” and lists the following triggers for imposing public
company status:
• revenues above a threshold (e.g., $100 million annually);
• a “market cap” above a threshold (e.g., $1 billion)
based on private market valuations;
• a “public float” in a private trading venue above a
threshold (e.g., $75 million);
• a number of beneficial owners of “securities”
above a threshold (e.g., 500), irrespective of “accredited investor” status; [. . .]
• a threshold number of employees (e.g., 250 fulltime equivalents); [and]
• receiv[ing] more than a certain dollar amount in
revenues directly from government contracts or
funds (e.g., $25 million).256
The menu of options offered by the report reflects the
evolving indicators of what it means to be a public company
and deserves careful consideration. While the proposed
thresholds are merely indicative, it is worth noting that they
are set at relatively low levels and that, as presented, exceeding
any one of them would be sufficient to push a firm into public
company status. As a practical matter, then, this would subject
most firms across the economy, except the smallest firms, to
255. See TYLER GELLASCH & LEE REINERS, FROM LAGGARD TO LEADER: UPSECURITIES REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO BETTER MEET THE NEEDS
OF INVESTORS AND SOCIETY (Glob. Fin. Mkts. Ctr. at Duke L., 2021), https://
bit.ly/31cXO1H.
256. Id. at 11.
DATING THE
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federal corporate law. It is also important to acknowledge
again that adopting these recommendations would require
congressional action, which appears unlikely as of this writing.
By virtue of the way they change the regulatory treatment of
private firms, the recommendations themselves will be disruptive to capital market participants, even with a phase-in period.
Finally, international regulatory competition is another likely
barrier to adoption. Forcing large and medium-sized U.S. private companies into public company status, and the full complement of public company regulation discussed in Section
I.C.1, is a significant and costly step that might lead at least
some of them to consider changing their domicile of incorporation. The rise of private capital is a global phenomenon and
so is the proliferation of unicorns, as illustrated by Figure A–6
and Figure A–9, respectively.
3. The “Shareholders of Record” Solution
In an October 2021 speech, SEC Commissioner Allison
Herren Lee offered an important and relatively easy-to-implement proposal for expanding the public realm.257 Commissioner Lee focused on the “shareholders of record” trigger for
public company status and made the case that the concept
should reflect the actual number of investors, which would
push many now-private firms beyond the threshold for registration and thus “create” a number of new public companies.258
Recall that under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, issuers of equity securities with at least $10 million in assets and
more than 2000 shareholders of record (or more than 500
shareholders of record who are not accredited investors) are
required to register the securities under the Exchange Act and
thereby become subject to the periodic reporting requirements for public companies.259 In other words, private compa257. See Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2021, Going Dark: The Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy (Oct. 12, 2021), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-sec-speaks-2021-10-12.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Note that the technical
term is “equity securities . . . held of record by . . . persons”; in line with
other commentators, I refer to “shareholders of record” for the sake of clarity.
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nies must become public companies upon exceeding the asset
and shareholder-base thresholds. The definition of “shareholders of record,” which dates back to the 1960s, does not
account for the fact that shares are held predominantly in
“street name” accounts, i.e., in the names of the intermediaries
through which they were purchased or institutions where they
are held, and not in the name of the underlying beneficial
owners.260 The SEC has estimated that “over 85% of the holders of securities in the U.S. markets hold through a brokerdealer or a bank that is a Depository Trust Company participant.”261 For this reason, at public companies and, importantly, at private companies that have gone through several
funding rounds, the shareholders of record number significantly understates the number of beneficial owners. The SEC’s
original proposal for Rule 12g5-1 in 1964 contained a “look
through” provision (looking through the street name holder
to get to, and count, the customers who hold the underlying
economic interest), but the final rule opted not to require
this.262 Today, redefining “shareholders of record” to reflect a
firm’s actual investor base would automatically push many private companies into public company status. According to
Commissioner Lee, doing so would be desirable in light of
market developments and justifiable in light of the legislative
history of Section 12(g).263
260. See Lee, supra note 257.
261. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
EXCHANGE ACT RULE 12G5-1 AND SUBSECTION (B)(3) 8 n.26 (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/files/authority-to-enforce-rule-12g5-1.pdf [hereinafter
SEC Rule 12g5-1 Study]. The same SEC Staff Report concluded that “issuers
with more than 2000 beneficial owners, but less than 2000 holders of record,
can be actively traded in the over-the-counter markets or in private secondary markets, without triggering the threshold requirements to report under
the Exchange Act.” Id. at 11.
262. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 4, at 356. The authors also
note that even though Rule 12g5-1 does not require look-through, other
SEC rules do provide for look-through under various circumstances; in other
words, look-through is not outside the norm. Id. They explain that “[t]he
absence of a look through widens the range of trading that can occur without 1934 Act regulation because beneficial owners can, and do, make individual decisions to sell their stock, so that one broker-dealer as record owner
may reflect the reality of hundreds of investors trading.” Id.
263. See Lee, supra note 257. (Commissioner Lee’s speech appeared as this
Article was being finalized and the present analysis is not intended to be
comprehensive.)
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Even though the notion of “shareholders of record” has
long attracted criticism,264 and even though it was subject to
some scrutiny in connection with Congress’ consideration of
the JOBS Act,265 all without any resolution, Commissioner
Lee’s recent focus on this issue is noteworthy. Unlike most of
the other proposals for rebuilding the public–private divide,
changing the “shareholder of record” definition can be done
by the SEC acting on its existing authority and without the
need for congressional authorization.266 Given the need to address problems in the public markets reflected in Commissioner Lee’s speech and the very low likelihood of cooperation
from Congress, the “shareholders of record” solution is one of
the few available avenues for reform.

264. See, e.g., Petition from Institutional Investors for Commission Action
to Require Exchange Act Registration of Over-the-Counter Equity Securities
(July 3, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-483.htm (noting,
inter alia, that “Rule 12g5-1 fails to properly effectuate the Congressional
intent expressed in Section 12 or the policy goals of the Exchange Act” and
making a detailed case for reform); GELLASCH & REINERS, supra note 255, at
11 (noting that “the SEC’s curious definition of ‘shareholder of record’ permits issuers, executives, and other interested parties to easily avoid the Section 12(g) trigger by simply aggregating owners into ownership vehicles or at
a small number of broker-dealers” and arguing for reform).
265. See Letter from North American Securities Administrators Association, to Senator Jack Reed (Mar. 22, 2012), https://bit.ly/31csG2l (asserting
that “[t]he current ‘holder of record’ definition creates confusion and
threatens investor confidence in the marketplace”); The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong.
16 (2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n) (noting that “since the definition of ‘held of record’ was put into
place, a fundamental shift has occurred in how securities are held in the
United States”). In addition, Section 504 of the JOBS Act required the SEC
to undertake a narrowly-focused study in respect of the anti-evasion provisions applicable to the concept of “shareholders of record”; because most of
the problems associated with the concept stem from its underinclusive nature (rather than from active efforts to evade the rules), however, those
problems fell outside the study’s narrow scope. See SEC Rule 12g5-1 Study,
supra note 261.
266. See Lee, supra note 257 (“[T]he Commission can and should act now
within our existing authority to restore transparency in capital markets. That
means, at a minimum, it’s time to revisit how we define shareholders of record under [Section] 12(g).”); see also GELLASCH & REINERS, supra note 255,
at 11 (asserting that “adopting a rule revising [the SEC’s] interpretation of
the ‘shareholder of record’ to reflect the actual owners of securities” represents a “change [that] can be made without legislation”).
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The expected impact of any proposal would depend on
the nature of the proposal; since no detailed proposal exists at
present, specific predictions can easily miss the mark. Nevertheless, we can observe with some certainty that moving the
concept of “shareholder of record” closer to the idea of “beneficial owner” would be a highly effective, albeit blunt and controversial, tool for reversing the breakdown of the public–private divide. Doing so will push many, and possibly most,
unicorns into public company status. Notably, it would do so
not by incentivizing them to undertake an IPO, but by subjecting them to public company regulation automatically and as a
result of the size of their investor base.
The “shareholders of record” move is likely to be controversial for at least two reasons. First, the differences between
public and private company status and the associated costs and
obligations have grown to be very substantial, as illustrated in
Section I.C.1; any change in regulatory treatment, therefore,
will be highly-consequential for day-to-day operations and regulatory obligations. Second, even though the change to the
SEC rulebook would be fairly minor (simply amending the
definition of “shareholder of record”), the consequences from
it would be profound: the resurrection of a now-forgotten
mechanism for forcing emerging companies into public company status, and, correspondingly, the sudden end of the “issuer choice” regime described in Section III.A. Therefore, it
should not be a foregone conclusion that the SEC would be
willing to take on, or, indeed, be equipped to withstand, the
likely pushback from market participants. Whereas the deregulatory cascade described in Section II.B unfolded over the
course of almost a decade, piecemeal and with little fanfare,
the re-regulation of private companies by amending the
“shareholder of record” definition is likely to be abrupt and
highly-visible, no matter the implementation approach.
How would the “shareholders of record” solution fare
with respect to the four concerns identified in Part III? As
noted already, it will eliminate the current “issuer choice” regime under which firms are able to acquire a broad investor
base and still avoid public company regulation by raising capital on the private markets. Resurrecting the Section 12(g) triggers for public company status will diminish the relative importance of the markets on which shares are sold, since the size of
the investor base, measured by the number of beneficial own-
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ers of shares, will push a number of firms into public company
status. Like before, special circumstances may still allow a limited number of firms to achieve scale without the need to raise
capital from a broad investor base.267
Relatedly, the “shareholders of record” solution will also
restore most of securities law’s diminished regulatory capacity,
the second major consequence of the breakdown of the public–private divide. By using the true size of the investor base as
a regulatory trigger, public company regulation will capture a
larger number of firms, including smaller and younger
firms.268 At the same time, if the goal is to use parts of securities law to regulate firms with a large societal footprint—or
firms characterized by “publicness”269—the size of a firm’s investor base would be a less-than-perfect proxy, since this metric
fails to take into account a firm’s impact on non-shareholder
constituencies, such as employees, customers, suppliers, communities, and the environment. In addition to being imprecise, zeroing in only on a firm’s investors when assessing its
overall societal footprint is normatively objectionable.270
The “shareholders of record” solution is likely to be effective, albeit indirectly, in addressing the fragmented nature of
investor protection, which was the third major consequence of
the breakdown of the public–private divide discussed in Part
III. Forcing private firms to become public companies upon
acquiring an investor base of a certain size would do nothing
to foreclose the many new mechanisms through which main267. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (noting the existence of a
limited number of large private companies that pre-date the rise of unicorns
during the 2010s).
268. As discussed in Section I.C.2 and Section III.B, the extent to which
securities regulation should be used to advance goals beyond classic investor
protection is open to debate. The point here is simply that imposing regulation through the “public company” regulatory category would become much
more effective, since the “shareholders of record” solution would cause
many more firms to fall within the definition of “public company.”
269. See infra notes 273–77 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for
Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499 (2020) (criticizing the
use of the investor-focused disclosure regime as a means of supplying important information to non-investor audiences); Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S.
Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583,
1671–73 (2018) (noting that analyzing the harms caused by sexual harassment through the lens of corporate law can create additional, “discursive
harms”).
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stream, non-accredited investors can invest in both private and
public companies, which were discussed in Section II.B; it will,
however, reduce the overall supply of private company stock
because it will reduce the number of private companies. As a
result, the share of private company securities in the portfolios
of mainstream investors will decrease, which, in turn, will mitigate the investor protection harms stemming from the breakdown of the public–private divide.
Finally, the “shareholders of record” solution would be
unable to address, and may in fact exacerbate, the increased
vulnerability of employee-investors—the fourth major consequence discussed in Part III. Recall that pursuant to the JOBS
Act, employee-investors are expressly excluded from the
“shareholders of record” count.271 Even though the SEC has
the authority to amend the definition of “shareholders of record,” it cannot amend it in a way that captures employee-investors, since this will be in direct conflict with congressional
intent to exclude employees from the count. Moreover, a
world in which investors cannot be bundled together through
the existing definition of “shareholders of record” is a world in
which every individual investor counts for purposes of the 2000
shareholder-of-record threshold except for employee-investors.
As a result, employee-investors would become the only source
of private capital that does not trigger Exchange Act registration and regulation. We can expect that as firms approach the
2000 shareholders-of-record threshold for registration, they
would place greater reliance on sourcing capital from employee-investors, with all of the attendant problems discussed
in Section III.D.
In sum, the “shareholders of record” solution would not
resolve all the consequences from the breakdown of the public–private divide in securities law discussed in this Article. It
would, however, represent a bold step toward rebuilding the
original public–private divide by making it impossible for firms
to acquire a sizeable investor base while maintaining private
company status, which, in turn, would automatically increase
the number of public companies. The blunt nature of this solution raises questions about its practical feasibility, even if the
SEC’s authority to pursue it is beyond question. Importantly,
the “shareholders of record” solution will not address the
271. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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problems faced by employee-investors and may exacerbate
them. Ultimately, the limits of the “shareholders of record” solution highlight the difficulties the SEC is likely to encounter if
it sets out to rebuild the public–private divide in securities law
without comprehensive assistance from Congress. (Whether
and when such assistance might be forthcoming is a question I
take up in Section IV.C below.)
B. Circumventing the Public–Private Divide
The fact that the breakdown of the original public–private divide has caused a series of problems does not automatically suggest that the only way to solve these problems is
by rebuilding the divide. Another conceptual approach to addressing the problems identified in this Article may be to reduce the regulatory stakes of the public–private distinction in
securities law. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive—it is possible to both reduce the stakes of the public–private distinction and to rebuild a version of the public–private divide.
Why might lowering the regulatory stakes of the public–private company distinction be desirable? As illustrated by
the public company regulatory paradox discussed in the Introduction, otherwise-identical firms can inhabit entirely different regulatory universes depending on their public or private
company status. Importantly, the regulatory universe in which
a firm finds itself now hinges solely on the firm’s capital raising
choices. As we saw in Section I.C, public companies are heavily
regulated in respect of various disclosure and corporate governance matters, whereas private companies are not. Moreover, the volume of regulation at issue has increased dramatically over the past two decades, as has the range of matters
covered by such regulation. This, in turn, has heightened the
compliance costs and the overall stakes of being a public company. Many of the deregulatory reforms described in Section
II.B can be viewed as reforms aimed at extending to private
firms benefits previously available only to public firms.
The difference between the regulatory treatment of public and private companies can be reduced by (1) narrowing
the scope of securities regulation to matters most closely related to financial investors’ buy/sell and voting decisions, and
(2) making aspects of what is now public company regulation
applicable to all business entities that meet certain criteria,
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without regard to public company status. This approach would
represent a substantial expansion of the role of the federal
government in the regulation of business entities, but it would
also reduce the weight of any individual firm’s decision with
respect to becoming a “public company” and make it possible
to rationalize the regulatory regime for capital raising.
Take disclosure regulation as an example. If all firms,
whether public or private, that meet certain pre-defined criteria unrelated to capital market activity become subject to a new
stakeholder-focused mandatory disclosure regime, then the
going-public decision is less likely to be affected by the perceived costs of the existing investor-focused mandatory disclosure regime. Ann Lipton has made the case for just such a new
stakeholder-focused mandatory disclosure regime on the
grounds of the social utility of providing stakeholders with
firm-specific disclosure and the inadequacy of existing investor-focused disclosure for non-investor audiences.272 Lipton’s
proposal for a separate stakeholder-focused disclosure regime
has the important additional benefit of removing the secrecy
advantage enjoyed by private firms vis-à-vis public firms and
streamlining the regulatory calculus embedded in the goingpublic decision.
The insight motivating this conceptual approach is a reaction to the public company regulatory paradox: a firm’s capital
raising choices should not determine, in a binary fashion,
whether or not it is subject to the extensive public company
regulatory regime that today covers many matters that are only
loosely-related to investor protection and may be better described as regulation in the service of business accountability,
transparency, efficiency, and other goals. Relatedly, even if
there is a robust public–private line for capital raising purposes, a firm’s obligations in respect of general economic regulation should not be determined by the side of this line on
which the firm finds itself.
Shifting federal economic regulation that currently operates through the public company category outside the realm of
securities regulation would require the creation of new, alternative regulatory categories that are not tied to a firm’s accessto-capital choices. Such alternative regulatory categories could
encompass metrics such as number of employees, revenues, as272. See Lipton, supra note 270.
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sets, and other indicators of a firm’s societal footprint, i.e., a
firm’s potential to generate societal externalities that ought to
be disclosed and/or regulated regardless of the firm’s financing choices. Hillary Sale has developed a theory of “publicness” that links federal economic regulation to a firm’s overall
societal footprint.273 Regulating on the basis of publicness can
be done with or without reference to a firm’s financing activities.274
Consider two specific examples, one concerning legislation from outside the United States and one concerning proposed U.S. legislation. The United Kingdom introduced a new
regulatory regime in 2018 requiring large private companies
to provide certain disclosures and comply with the substantive
provisions of its new Corporate Governance Code.275 While
the public–private divide in the United Kingdom was never as
pronounced as that in the United States, the new U.K. Corporate Governance Code circumvents the public–private divide
entirely and imposes regulation that had previously applied on
the basis of a company’s status as a stock-exchange listed entity
to all companies that meet certain criteria.276 Contemporaneous amendments to other parts of U.K. corporate law require
all companies (both public and private) with more than 250
U.K.-based employees to provide a statement describing any
employee empowerment initiatives pursued by the company
and summarizing “how the directors have engaged with employees” and “how the directors have had regard to employee
interests, and the effect of that regard, including on the princi-

273. See Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137, 137–38 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Essay, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of
Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629, 1630–31 (2014); Hillary A. Sale,
The Corporate Purpose of Social License, Geo. L. Fac. Pubs. No. 2171 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2171.
274. See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 649 (2016); Guttentag, supra note 248.
275. See Corporate Governance for Private Companies: Restoring Trust in Big Business, LINKLATERS, https://bit.ly/3o36jFu.
276. The Code’s corporate governance reporting requirements apply to
non-listed U.K. companies that meet one of two thresholds: (1) have more
than 2000 employees globally, or (2) have annual turnover over £200 million
and a balance sheet over £2 billion. Id.
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pal decisions taken by the company during the financial
year.”277
In the United States, the Accountable Capitalism Act proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren in 2018 constructs a new
regulatory category, “large entity,” defined as any domestic entity engaged in interstate commerce with more than $1 billion
in annual gross receipts.278 Defined this way, the category captures both public and private companies. Under the Act’s proposal, large entities would be subject to a variety of corporate
governance regulations; previous proposals in respect of some
of these regulations were limited to public companies only.279
The purpose of this discussion is to outline an alternative
conceptual approach with respect to the future of the public–private divide in securities law rather than to analyze or endorse any of the specific proposals that have been mentioned.
The more work the public–private divide is asked to do (and,
particularly, work beyond the regulation of capital raising),
the more pressure there is on the public–private distinction. If
there are new regulatory categories that circumvent the public–private distinction, the effectiveness of the regulations employing those categories would likely be enhanced; such an approach would also make it easier to recalibrate the existing investor protection standards for public capital markets.
277. See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI
2018/860 (UK); see also Georgiev, Human Capital Management, supra note 61,
at 658–59 and sources cited therein. The same category of companies are
also required to disclose the gender pay gap on an annual basis. See Aleksandra Wisniewska et al., Gender Pay Gap: How Women Are Short-Changed in the UK,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), https://ig.ft.com/gender-pay-gap-UK.
278. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). Aggregation rules based on the IRS Code safeguard against evading regulation by
splintering entities to fall beneath the $1 billion threshold. Id. Large entities
would be required to obtain a charter as a “United States corporation” from
a newly-created Office of United States Corporations within the Department
of Commerce. Id.
279. For example, whereas the Accountable Capitalism Act would require
that employees of large entities (i.e., registered “United States corporations”)
be given the power to elect at least 40% of the board (Id. at § 6(b)(1)), the
Reward Work Act, proposed by Senator Tammy Baldwin, would give employees of public companies (but not private companies) the power to elect onethird of directors. See Press Release, Off. of Sen. Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Reintroduces Legislation to Rein in Stock Buybacks and
Give Workers a Voice on Corporate Boards (Mar. 27, 2019), https://bit.ly/
3rhFaR7.
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C. Reform Preconditions and Process
The reform options discussed above are likely to be difficult and costly to implement. Given historical patterns of regulation,280 as well as the political and logistical roadblocks to
reform,281 securities law may well need to wait until the next
big market crisis before the public company regulatory paradox can be addressed.
What are the preconditions for change? Using a “critical
junctures” framework, a recent paper by Steven Bank and
Brian Cheffins suggests that a stock market crash may not be a
sufficient condition for corporate law change.282 Bank & Cheffins find that, in addition to a stock market crash, major reforms require “a lengthy period of depressed share prices and
a perception amongst contemporaries that business wrongdoing precipitated or was otherwise integrally related to the
slump.”283 If these patterns hold, it may well be a long time
before there is a window of opportunity to return securities
law to a state of conceptual coherence. As significant as they
are, the immediate consequences of the breakdown of the
public–private divide are not guaranteed to result in a stock
market crash, a lengthy bear market, and a turn in public
opinion connecting market problems to business wrongdoing.
A market calamity of such proportions is much more likely to
be caused by macroeconomic imbalances, financial engineer-

280. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 849, 855 (1997) (asserting that regulatory surges
do not occur randomly and that the catalyst is a crash).
281. See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1799–1816 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Dodd–Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated
and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
282. See Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Law’s Critical Junctures, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/id=3877329.
The authors explain that “[i]n the social sciences context, a critical juncture
is an historical moment during which substantially greater change is possible
than during the preceding and subsequent periods of stability.” Id. at 3.
283. Id. at 4. The authors further note that “the prolonged downturn and
the discrediting of the status quo provide an opening for major change absent under normal circumstances,” which includes strong investor and public interest in regulation and, importantly, the inability of “incumbent financial and business interests” to stave off major reform due to their temporarily
weakened position. Id. at 4–5.
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ing gone awry, a natural disaster, or a “black swan”-type event.
Of course, none of this can be predicted.
Recognizing that urgent reform may be impossible even if
it seems necessary allows the luxury of time to reconsider the
institutional design of securities regulation—the allocation of
responsibility amongst the SEC, Congress, and courts, as well
as the liability structure of securities law.284 This deliberative
approach may resemble the foundational debates around the
adoption of the original securities laws during the 1930s. As we
saw in Section I.C, both the means and the ends of public
company regulation have grown more uncertain and more
controversial over time. Questions such as the appropriate
scope of the public company regulatory regime, the meaning
of the statutory goals of “investor protection” as well as “efficiency, competition, and capital formation,” the relevance of
unstated-yet-manifested goals such as business transparency
and accountability, the allocation of regulatory responsibility
between state and federal law, among others, can all benefit
from considered examination.
It is often said that “a crisis is a terrible thing to
waste”285—but so is the time before a crisis. There is a lot that
the SEC can do today to ensure that when the next opportunity for change arises, it will be ready to contribute to the legislative process drawing upon its authority and technical expertise. Specifically, the SEC should as soon as possible initiate a
broad deliberative process involving multiple stakeholders to
come up with a blueprint for capital market regulatory reform
to address the breakdown of the public–private divide. Even if
this blueprint is not put into immediate use due to congressional inaction, having such a blueprint will help the agency
navigate the next occasion when Congress is focused on financial and capital market regulation. It will also make it more
difficult for special interests to take over the regulatory process; as we have seen, in the absence of an SEC blueprint, pri284. Scholars have made the case for examining securities law’s institutional design due to a variety of different concerns. See, e.g., Zachary J.
Gubler, Reconsidering the Institutional Design of Federal Securities Regulation, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 409 (2014); MARK I. STEINBERG, RETHINKING SECURITIES
LAW (2021); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (2016).
285. See Jack Rosenthal, A Terrible Thing to Waste, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 31,
2009), https://nyti.ms/3yreIpG (discussing the history of the quote).
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vate actors supply their own blueprints which often turn into a
regulatory agenda.286
A change of approach on a more procedural level may
also be advisable. Notice-and-comment rulemaking in respect
of specific proposals is not an effective means of surveying a
wide range of regulatory options or considering foundational
regulatory questions such as those listed in the preceding
paragraphs; the SEC’s use of “concept releases” as a step-zero
in notice-and-comment rulemaking, which grew more widespread during the 2010s, is a minor improvement at best. The
SEC has used special committees comprised of internal and
external experts in prior decades and it should renew this
practice. Each of the policy proposals discussed in Sections
IV.A and IV.B above deserves careful consideration. In addition, the SEC should focus on data gathering and analysis of
private capital raising, most of which still occurs in the
shadows. Finally, the SEC should use its authority to engage in
investor testing in connection with major policy proposals,
which Congress reaffirmed in 2010 through Section 912 of the
Dodd–Frank Act.287 Drawing on the outputs of a well-designed
deliberative process and armed with adequate evidence, the
SEC can steer the policy conversation with respect to the public–private divide at securities law’s next critical juncture,
whenever it might occur.
CONCLUSION
This Article started by identifying a public company regulatory paradox, which motivated the present inquiry: it is possible today for two virtually identical firms to be subject to widely
different regulatory obligations, which depend solely on the
firms’ financing choices. Public companies must comply with
286. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting the wholesale
adoption of deregulatory proposals contained in the IPO Task Force Report
through the JOBS Act) & supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting the
wholesale adoption of deregulatory proposals advocated in a 2018 report
from the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation).
287. See Dodd–Frank Act § 912, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(e) (providing that the
SEC may “(1) gather information from and communicate with investors or
other members of the public; (2) engage in such temporary investor testing
programs as the Commission determines are in the public interest or would
protect investors; and (3) consult with academics and consultants, as necessary . . . .”).
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an extensive and elaborate disclosure and governance framework related to investor protection, transparency, and accountability, whereas private companies are free to operate
without disclosure and governance oversight at the federal
level. As we saw, the present-day regulatory paradox is a manifestation of the breakdown of the longstanding public–private
divide in securities law.
The Article then presented an account of how the public–private divide has lost its descriptive and explanatory power
as an organizing principle of securities law. The breakdown of
the divide has been a function of numerous, often-incremental
deregulatory policies in the service of capital formation during
the 2010s, which were, in turn, spurred by significant evolutionary shifts in capital markets and justified with reference to
the massive expansion of public company regulation through
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act of
2010. In addition to highlighting the breakdown of the divide,
the Article identified serious systemic and stakeholder-specific
consequences: the now-elective nature of public company regulation, the diminished regulatory capacity of securities law,
the fragmentation of investor protection, and the increased
vulnerability of employee-investors. Addressing these
problems, by rebuilding the divide, circumventing it, or
through other means, will likely require foundational changes
to the regulatory regime. It will also require policymakers and
regulators to update the notions of investor protection, capital
formation, efficiency, competition, and, more generally, what
it means to regulate capital markets in the public interest.
The Article’s focus on the public–private divide should
not obscure several analytical points. First, private capital certainly has a role to play in the modern economy; small, earlystage private companies are often a source of significant innovation, which results in benefits to society. There is, for example, much hope that startups focused on clean energy will help
with the transition to a greener economy. Nothing here suggests that securities law should treat such firms in the same way
as their mature counterparts; as noted throughout, the focus is
on larger private companies, such as unicorns, that have been
in existence for some time and that have acquired a substantial
footprint in terms of implied valuation, investor base, number
of employees, and various other metrics. Second, while the
public (regulated) vs. private (unregulated) markets dichot-
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omy is helpful, it does not imply that public markets are perfect; certain specific aspects of the regulation of public markets are the subject of lively academic and policy debates,
which lie outside the scope of this Article. Finally, as a factual
matter, most large private firms do eventually elect to transition to public company status. One could therefore posit that
intervention is unnecessary, because the problems identified
here resolve themselves over the long run and at the level of
individual firms. This Article has shown that the problems that
arise over the short- and medium-run, as well as on a systemic
level, are serious enough to warrant regulatory attention.
Zooming out, it is worth noting that because financial
capital is both highly mobile and highly morphable, regulating
it has never been easy. Political, macroeconomic, technological, and even epistemological challenges abound. More so
than in other areas, law here plays a dual rule: not only to
proscribe harmful activities, but also to actively enable beneficial ones. In 2021, there are various capital market phenomena that straddle the line between harmful and beneficial,
including SPACs, stablecoins, other cryptocurrencies, and certain stock trading platforms. There are also various phenomena that are clearly problematic, such as unaccounted for risks
(including climate and cybersecurity), asset valuation issues
pertaining to human capital, data assets, and other intangibles, and, as always, issues related to fraud, capital market
microstructure, and international competition.
The SEC’s ability to solve these problems and future ones,
as well as the nature of the solutions, will in large part turn on
the renegotiation of the public–private divide. The regulatory
future is uncertain, but it is safe to say that securities law’s most
interesting and challenging years lie ahead.
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APPENDIX:
TRENDS IN CAPITAL MARKETS

OF

U.S. LISTED IPOS (1995–2021)

Source: Corri Driebusch, IPOs Keep Jumping Higher. How Long Will the Ride
Last, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2021), https://on.wsj.com/3lkKAHj (reporting
data from Dealogic).
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FIGURE A–2: NUMBER OF U.S. LISTED AND U.S. PRIVATE
EQUITY-OWNED COMPANIES (2000–2017)

Source: Capital Raising Goes Back to the Future, NEUBERGER BERMAN, https://
bit.ly/32M3IYc (last visited Nov. 30, 2021) (reporting data from World Bank,
World Federation of Exchanges, PitchBook, Credit Suisse).

FIGURE A–3: ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT
INDUSTRY (1990–2019)

FOR

U.S. BUYOUT

Source: MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN STANLEY, PUBLIC
PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM LOOK 34 (2020),
https://mgstn.ly/31CaMpV (reporting data from PitchBook, NVCA, and
Counterpoint Global).
TO
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FIGURE A–4: VOLUME OF CAPITAL RAISED BY U.S. COMPANIES
IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MARKETS (2009–2017)

Source: Jean Eaglesham & Coulter Jones, The Fuel Powering Corporate America:
$2.4 Trillion in Private Fundraising, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://
on.wsj.com/3xz1B5m (reporting data from Dealogic and an analysis of SEC
filings).

FIGURE A–5: VOLUME OF CAPITAL RAISED BY U.S. COMPANIES
IN EXEMPT AND REGISTERED OFFERINGS (2009–2018)
(SEC)

Source: U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Concept Release on Harmonization of
Securities Offering Exemptions, Securities Act Release No. 33–10,649, 84 Fed.
Reg. 30,460, 30,465 (proposed June 26, 2019) (reporting data from the SEC
Division of Economic and Risk Analysis).
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FIGURE A–6: GROWTH OF GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY
EQUITY (%) (2000–2020)

AND
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PUBLIC

Source: MCKINSEY, MCKINSEY’S PRIVATE MARKETS ANNUAL REVIEW 19 (2021),
https://mck.co/3o6olXp (reporting data from World Federation of Exchanges
and Preqin).

FIGURE A–7: TIME TO IPO AND MARKET CAPITALIZATION
IPO: AMAZON, GOOGLE, FACEBOOK, UBER

AT

Source: MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN STANLEY, PUBLIC
PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM LOOK 49 (2020),
https://mgstn.ly/31CaMpV (reporting data from company SEC filings and
Counterpoint Global).
TO
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FIGURE A–8: NUMBER OF UNICORNS AND TOTAL CAPITAL
RAISED BY UNICORNS IN UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND REST OF
THE WORLD (2016–2021)

(Data reported on a quarterly basis.)
Source: Technology Unicorns Are Growing at a Record Clip, ECONOMIST, Jul. 24,
2021, https://econ.st/3IxkXwT (reporting data from CB Insights).

FIGURE A–9: QUARTERLY STOCK BUYBACKS
COMPANIES (1998–2019)

BY

S&P 500

(Data shown in billions of U.S. dollars.)
Source: Richard Henderson, Fall in Share Buybacks Poses Threat to US Stocks,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://on.ft.com/3ox4Ln8 (reporting data
from S&P Dow Jones Indices).

